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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyzes how stock-for-stock M&As influence the use of income increasing EM in 
the period prior to such a merger or acquisition. This examination is done by performing 
computations of some diagnostics developed by Penman (2013) on a recent case of M&A deal 
announced on 2018 and closed in 2020. Firstly, this study provides the application of Penman’s 
approach to the acquirer’s side going through the reclassification of the balance sheet in order 
to highlight and separate the operating section. Thereafter it provides the same for evaluating 
the target’s side, to check if there could be some possibility of EM from both perspectives. This 
study contributes to existing literature by providing evidence on EM that may be valuable for 
investors, analysts, directors and shareholders.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The EM phenomenon in case of M&A deals has become a widely discussed topic in the past 
few years, as a consequence of financial scandals occurred in recent times. Understanding what 
it is and what are the reasons for its use is fundamental for investors, analysts and for all the 
stakeholders involved in certain processes and transactions. In particular, the main source of 
information for these subjects is represented by the financial statements, through which the 
corporate disclosure is made public, essential for them to build a clear image of the company, 
its business, its strategy and financial situation. Theoretically, companies should select 
accounting methods and procedures to make estimates that reflect their performance in the most 
neutral and unbiased possible way. 
However, the relationship between investors and managers does not appear to be, in most cases, 
characterized by transparency and this is where the possible presence of earning manipulation 
comes into play, in order to meet investors’ expectations and at the expense of a truthful and 
reliable reported information.  
Financial economists, regulators and accountants have long recognized that managers exercise 
discretion over accounting rules to manipulate their firm’s earnings in many contexts, but there 
is a situation in which, according to the most part of researchers, EM is widely applied. This 
situation regards the stock for stock type corporate merger. 
 
Understanding which companies make use of manipulation is one of the most difficult 
challenge for analysts and therefore numerous methods have been implemented to carry out 
this examination. These methods very often do not aim to express decisive judgments on the 
presence of EM phenomenon, but simply allow analysts to focus their attention on situations 
that could prove to be suspicious. This particular attention is justified with the absolute need to 
deduce, from the limited companies’ disclosures, the real value of the firm and its assets. From 
this point of view, the literature provides numerous analysis models, both quantitative and 
qualitative, which, through an in-depth consultation of financial statements, allow to summarize 
the main aspects, to eventually recognize the presence of manipulation. 
 
This thesis aims to analyzes how stock-for-stock M&A influence the use of income increasing 
EM in the period prior to such a merger or acquisition, through the application of a specific 
operating method. 
Particularly, the remainder of this thesis is organized in the following manner. The second 
section provides at first some theoretical background on the M&A phenomenon, and gives an 
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analysis of existing literature, about what determines the success and the creation of values in 
such type of deals.  
In the third section the literature dedicated to the EM phenomenon will be analyzed to define 
this practice in all its different shapes through the contribution of various authors, determining 
its motivations and techniques. Thereafter the literature on the presence of EM in case of M&A 
deals will be scrutinized. Finally, the statistical approach through which the phenomenon was 
studied by analyzing its main models is also presented. 
The fourth section provides information about the methodology of this research with the aim 
of transposing this theoretical analysis into a pragmatic analysis. So, we focus on a particular 
method developed by Stephen H. Penman, which will be explained and analyzed in detail, after 
which section five shows the results of its application. Finally, a conclusion is provided.  
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2. M&As phenomenon: a theoretical overview 
An M&A deal could be analyzed as a system. A system needs to be internally consistent and 
therefore its parts need to fit together in a sensible way. Moreover, it must anticipate the side 
effects, giving the deal designer a wide-angle perspective by encouraging him to look out for 
the cumulative effect of tinkering (Bruner, 2004).  
An M&A can be defined as the blend of two or more companies into one new company or 
corporation. The main difference between the two mentioned lies in the manner in which the 
combination of the companies is carried out (Moskovicz, 2018). 
The term M&A refers to a number of different types of transaction. In almost every M&A 
transaction there is an acquirer firm and an acquired firm. In the typical merger the Bidder 
absorbs the Target. Bidder acquires all of the assets and liabilities of Target, which ceases to 
exist. This kind of transaction is also called forward merger. In a reverse merger it is the 
Target absorbing the Bidder. There is also another type of merger, called consolidation with 
which an entirely new firm is created (Newco) and both the Target and the Bidder cease to exist 
(Iannotta, 2010). 
Merger is the combination of two companies usually by a mutual agreement that form an 
entirely new company. Mergers happen for a number of reasons and in a number of ways. 
There are five commonly referred to types of business combinations known as mergers: 
horizontal merger, vertical merger, conglomerate merger, congeneric merger and market 
extension merger. The term chosen to describe the merger depends on the economic function, 
purpose of the business transaction and relationship between the merging companies (Hargrave, 
2019). 
• Horizontal merger occurs between companies operating in the same industry, typically 
done by competitors that want to consolidate in order to create a larger business with greater 
market share and economies of scale to reduce costs and maximize synergies. 
• Vertical merger is when two companies operating at different levels within the same 
industry's supply chain combine their operations. 
• Conglomerate merger can be subdivided into pure and mixed and describes the business 
combination between two firms operating in unrelated business activities. The main driver 
for such M&As is risk diversification.  
• Congeneric merger, also known as a Product Extension merger, combines firms that 
operate in the same market with overlapping factors and happens when a new product line 
from one company is added to an existing product line of the other company. The major 
reason for this merger is to gain a larger market share.  
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• Market Extension merger occurs between companies that sell the same products but 
compete in different market that want to achieve a bigger client base (Hargrave, 2019). 
Acquisition refers to the process through which the acquiring company gets a controlling 
interest in the share capital of the acquired company. In acquisitions, there is a change in 
management of the target company, but both the firms retain their separate legal identity 
(Godbole, 2013). In this case, no new company is created. When the Bidder purchases all or 
part of Target’s stock the process is called stock acquisition. Alternatively, the Bidder can 
purchase all or part of Target’s assets, that is asset acquisition. A transaction can be friendly or 
hostile. In a friendly transaction, managers of the Target welcome the deal. In contrast, in a 
hostile transaction (hostile takeover), the Target’s management does not want to be acquired. 
Bruner (2004) developed the structure-conduct-outcomes framework, that according to him, 
does exercise on the M&A process. In particular, the direction of the influence starts from the 
structure that drives conduct and outcomes; and conduct shapes structure and drives outcomes. 
So, the success of an M&A deal is driven by the structure of the M&A opportunity one faces, 
as well as the conduct by which one pursue it (Bruner, 2004). Following his arguments, the 
elements of the structure include:  
• Economics of opportunity, that are factors determining the financial risk and return of the 
deal; 
• Strategy, that means analyzing the strategic position for the target and for the acquirer, 
drilling through the different scenarios of opportunities that the players in the “game” could 
encounter; 
• The ability to integrate the organizations of the subjects involved in order to create real 
synergies. In fact, failures to integrate well the businesses can torpedo a deal that, on paper, 
looked like a winner; 
• The brand is another important component in terms of ability of “signaling”, through which 
the company is able to differentiate itself from the others. Specifically, in M&A context, 
personal brand assumes a key role, in the sense that people involved in the deal (like 
particular CEOs, financial advisors and managers) can exercise a very high influence on the 
outcome of the process. 
The second important aspect highlighted is the conduct that plays a fundamental role in the 
“game”. It is the intervention in the pursuit of good outcomes, when dealers must take strategic 
decisions. The conduct pervades all the aspects of an M&A deal, from the search for partners 
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to the due diligence, the negotiation process till the post-merger integration. But the whole 
scope of the M&A deal is its outcome, that needs to be benchmarked against the creation of 
market value and the enhancement of the brand, as well as against an improved strategic 
position and the reaching of a certain financial stability. Last, but not least, Bruner underlines 
the importance to be compliant to law and ethics. This is also linked to the concept on which 
all the thesis is developed, that is the level of honesty, duty and law observance looking at the 
deal from different angles. 
2.1.  Motivations for M&A activities  
 
In literature many researchers went through different studies in order to test and prove the 
diverse motives behind the realization of this particular phenomenon, but, in general, we can 
say that there exist a series of the more prominent theories about why M&As happen.  There 
are probably almost as many motives of M&As as there are bidders and targets. Some common 
motives include synergy, diversification, tax considerations, management incentives or buying 
undervalued assets (Tarun et al., 2003). Although the rationale may differ from one merger or 
acquisition to another and linked to that, several theories developed that may describe the 
motives for M&A. Trautwein (1990) studied various theories regarding merger explanations 
and classified them into seven groups: efficiency, monopoly, valuation, empire-building, raider, 
process, and disturbance theory. Out of these theories first four are in the favor of the 
shareholders of the acquirer company. The next ones relate to the managers of the acquirer 
organization. Process theory considers a merger to be an outcome of processes and disturbance 
theory considers a merger to be a macroeconomic phenomenon (Bedi & Vij, 2017). 
 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) suggest three major motives for M&As: synergy, agency, 
and hubris. They provide a way to distinguish among these different hypotheses by looking at 
the correlation between target and total gains. It is discussed that this correlation should be 
positive if synergy is the motive, negative if agency is the motive, and zero if hubris is the 
motive. They found that synergy is the primary motive in M&As with positive total gains 
whereas agency is the primary motive in M&As with negative total gains. 
 
In order for the synergies to be effectively connected to the creation of value, McLetchie et al 
(2010) from McKinsey research argue that acquirers should find a balance between traditional 
or “combinational” synergies and “transformational” synergies, in order to outperform over 
time. The former type of synergies relies on merging operations, resulting in scale economies 
and/or basic scope economies, as well as protecting value by ensuring business continuity 
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(commonly known as operational and financial synergies). These synergies are the least risky, 
easiest to quantify, and most easily managed with a repeatable process. The latter, on the other 
hand, typically unlock one or more long-standing constraints on a business. Indeed, they require 
a huge management’s ability to deal with complexity, that is why they need to provide 
incentives with real upsides for a breakthrough performance. 
As far as diversification is concerned as another motive that pushes M&As, Koller et al. (2015) 
state that diversification is intrinsically neither good nor bad; it all depends on whether the 
parent company is the best owner for the businesses in its portfolio. Some executives believe 
it could bring benefits of its own, such as more stable aggregate cash flows, tax benefits from 
higher debt capacity, and better timing of investments across business cycles. Yet there is a cost 
for these benefits in terms of complexity and bureaucracy leading the firm to a situation of 
underperformance compared to its competitors. In reality, going through different studies, they 
have not found any evidence that diversified companies actually generate smoother cash flows. 
Moreover, there is considerable evidence that acquisitions resulting in unrelated diversification 
frequently result in lower financial returns when they are announced than non-diversifying 
acquisitions (Akbulut and Matsusaka, 2010).This is due to the so called conglomerate or 
diversification discount, a measure that sometimes values conglomerates as much as 15% lower 
than more focused firms in the same industry. This can be caused by two issues. The first is 
that investors may find difficult to value different parts of highly diversified businesses; the 
second is that they may perceive this type of firms as riskier because they think that 
management most likely tend to be focused on extending their “empire” rather than to improve 
the performance (Koller et al., 2015).  
2.2. M&As Value Creation 
According to Koller et al. (2015) the strategic rationale for a value creating M&A should fit at 
least one of what they define as “Archetypes”, that are not simply based on the mere concept 
of grow or strategic positioning, but they try to translate these concepts in something more 
pragmatic. Moreover, the creation of value is strictly connected to the price of the transaction 
because the acquisition will not create value for the bidder if it overpays, even if the deal is 
consistent with one or more of the following six archetypes: 
1. Improve the performance of the target company refers to the action of acquisition of a 
company that allows to increase its margins and cash flows through the reduction of costs. 
This is often pursued by Private Equity firms which have a clear investment focus (in terms 
of industry and company size) so they know since the beginning in what industry they want 
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to invest because they have a certain knowledge of the sector. Investment objectives could 
range between high growth, restructuring and mature companies. They focus on financial 
optimization, both in terms of performance and cash flow generation (so optimizing 
working capital, financial structure, revenue growth). They cannot improve the value of the 
company through synergies, but they can only improve performances. This is easier when 
the target has low margins and low return on invested capital (ROIC). 
2. Consolidate to remove excess capacity from an industry. This strategy is intended for 
companies that are in a mature phase of their business life cycle, in industries where the 
production is higher than the demand; or in order for them to avoid a price war reducing the 
competition in the specific industry. The consolidation does not come without some cons, 
because while there is substantial value to be created from removing excess capacity, this 
value often accrues just to the seller’s shareholders, not considering the target’s ones. In 
addition, there could be a problem of free riding in the extent to which all the other 
competitors in the industry may benefit from the capacity reduction without having to take 
any action of their own.  
3. Create or accelerate market access for the target’s (or, in some cases, the buyer’s) 
products. This is the case of relatively small companies that need to gain access to the 
potential market for their products or services. Therefore, bigger companies can largely 
profit from this situation. In other cases, the target’s company may provide to the bidder a 
faster access to new markets.  
4. Acquire skills or technologies more quickly or at lower cost than they could be built in-
house. This strategy consists of acquisitions made mostly by technology-based firms eager 
to buy other companies with technologies they need to enhance their own products. This is 
way faster and less expensive that developing the technology internally, and allows to avoid 
royalty payments on patented technologies, gaining a better position in terms of competitive 
advantage.  
5. Exploit a business’s industry-specific scalability. As said before, economies of scale are 
considered a key source of value creation in M&A. This is generally true when a large 
company buys a smaller one, but not in the case in which the two companies involved in 
the deal are already operating on scale. For an acquisition to create value, economies of 
scale have to be unique, that is why general rationale as back-office savings may be not a 
good reason to go for it. 
6. Pick winners early and help them develop their businesses. The final strategic rationale 
involves making acquisitions early in the life cycle of a new industry or product line, long 
before most others recognize that the industry will grow to a large size. This involves the 
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management of the bidder to get exposed on three different sides: it needs to be willing to 
risk, ready to accept a potential failure and to have the skills and patience to nurture the 
acquired businesses (Koller et al., 2015). 
A question that pops up in mind when thinking about M&As is whether it pays or not. For many 
consultants like Grubb and Lamb (2000), M&As simply destroy value: 
“[T]he sobering reality is that only about 20 percent of all mergers really succeed. Most 
mergers typically erode shareholder wealth...the cold, hard reality that most mergers fail to 
achieve any real financial returns...very high rate of merger failure...rampant merger 
failure…” 
Bruner (2002) states that the scientific research and numerous studies do not support the 
aforementioned view. One possible reason for the disparity between popular perception and 
scientific findings is confusion about what it means for an investment “to pay.” According to 
Bruner an “investment is successful if it does anything other than destroy value”. In order to 
assess if a deal is good or bad, he uses the “investor required return”1 as a benchmark, against 
which three different output can be defined: 
1. Value conserved, when no new value is created, therefore the investments return is equal to 
required return. Investors earns “normal” returns and the investment has a net present value 
of zero. 
2. Value created, when new value is created and the return on investment is higher that the 
required return. 
3. Value destroyed, when investments return is less than required return and therefore 
investors bear a loss in value. 
Going to the core of this concept, Koller et al. (2015) state that acquisitions are a good example 
of the conservation of value principle. They create value when the cash flows of the combined 
companies are greater than they would have otherwise been. If the acquirer doesn’t pay too 
much for the acquisition, some of that value will accrue to the acquirer’s shareholders. More 
specifically, the value received by the acquirer equals the intrinsic value of the target company 
as a stand-alone company plus the present value of any performance improvements to be 
achieved after the acquisition, which will result in an increase of cash flows for the combined 
 
1 IRR: return investors could have earned on other investment opportunities of similar risk. 
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firm. The price paid is the market value of the target plus any premium required to convince 
the target’s shareholders to sell their shares to the acquirer (Koller et al., 2015):  
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 =  (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 
+ 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠)  − (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 
+  𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚)2. 
Having said that, what really matters for investors and for the shareholders potentially involved 
in a deal is to understand whether they can capture some profitability from the potential 
transactions. Bruner (2002) summarizes four different types of approaches used in the 
researches that provide a measurement for M&As profitability. These are: 
1. Event studies: These examine the abnormal returns to shareholders in the period 
surrounding the announcement of a transaction. The raw return for one day is simply the 
change in share price and any dividends paid, divided by the closing share price the day 
before. The abnormal return is simply the raw return less a benchmark of what investors 
required that day—typically, the benchmark is the return calculated by the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) or quite simply the return on a large market index, such as NIFTY 
(Bruner, 2002). These studies are regarded to be forward-looking on the assumption that 
share prices reflect the present value of expected future cash flows to shareholders and 
allows to directly measure the value created for them. A drawback of this approach is that 
it requires to formulate significant assumptions regarding the functioning of the stock 
market: efficiency, rationality, and absence of restrictions on arbitrage.  
2.  Accounting studies: These examine the reported financial results of acquirers before, and 
after, acquisitions to see how financial performance changed. They are structured as 
matched-sample comparisons, matching acquirers with non-acquirers based on industry and 
size of firm and the question is whether the acquirers outperformed their non-acquirer peers. 
An important strength of this approach is the credibility; indeed, it is used a lot by investors 
to have a general overview of the company they are dealing with. Moreover, it is based on 
numbers that somehow you can prove or check, and it is an indirect measure of economic 
value creation. Of course, there are some not negligible cons: first of all, this approach is 
forward looking; secondly, it could happen that different accounting policies are adopted 
by companies throughout different years or accounting standard could vary among 
 
2 Koller et al., 2015 
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countries. A particular drawback can also be the low quality of accounting disclosure, that 
will be furtherly discussed later on. 
3. Surveys of executives: These present a sample of executives with a standardized 
questionnaire, in which they are asked to state if the acquisition created value or not. On the 
one hand it allows to yield insights into value creation that might not be known in the stock 
market; on the other hand it gives voice to the managers perspective that are surely not free 
from bias, and that could be aligned or not to the shareholders’ perspectives (recalling 
Jensen and Meckling Agency problem). Typically, surveys have a low rate of participation 
(2-10%) that makes them subject to criticisms of generalizability. 
4. Clinical studies: these are focused on a deep analysis of the deal that allows to find new 
insight by drilling down into the details of the transactions. It is an inductive type of 
research, objective and capable of discovering new patterns. The downside is that reports 
could be idiosyncratic making it difficult for the reader to abstract and generalize a concept 
from one or more studies (Bruner, 2002). 
2.3. The drivers of profitability  
Whether an M&A will pay or not is strictly related to the degree of “focus, consistency and 
professionalism” with which the acquirer manages the deal and, subsequently, how it runs the 
combined entity. This is connected to the best owner principle, that refers to that owner which 
possess distinctive skills, resources, technologies, links to other important players and finally 
able to exercise the best governance required for its particular business. The definition of best 
owner is not static, and best owners themselves will change over time as a business’s 
circumstances change. Thus, a business’s best owner could at different times be a larger 
company, a private-equity firm, a government, a sovereign wealth fund, a family, the business’s 
customers, its employees, or shareholders whenever a business becomes an independent public 
company listed on a stock exchange (Koller et al., 2015). 
In line with this concept, Campbell (2002) talks about the so-called parenting advantage. He 
states that normal firms with sound corporate strategies create value from the parent’s skills 
and the target’s needs, but the best companies have an added value, that is the ability to be the 
best owner for the target in order to create more value than competitors would (Campbell, 
2002). 
According to Ferrer at al. (2013) from McKinsey, the best acquirers are those that have the 
following capabilities, which are fundamental in order to keep and build a sustainable 
competitive advantage overtime:  
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• Engage in M&A thematically: the ability to focus on maximum two or three explicit M&A 
themes to develop the corporate strategy through business plans that consider both M&A 
and organic strategies to achieve specific purpose. Priority themes are very accurate and are 
those where the company needs M&A to deliver its strategy and have the ability to add 
value to targets.  
• Manage reputation as an acquirer. Companies that invest in their reputation as acquirers 
are perceived as bold, focused on collaboration, and able to provide real mentorship and 
distinctive capabilities for the target. Enhancing their reputation makes them able to gain a 
not negligible competitive advantage, facilitation the integration process and reducing the 
chances of bidding war. 
• Confirm the strategic vision. The financial due diligence is reinforced with a strategic due 
diligence. That is, given the additional information available after the letter of intent, 
managers can better assess the feasibility of their scopes and strategy, as well as seeing 
whether their vision of the future operating model is actually achievable. 
• Reassess performance improvement targets. Successful acquirers revise expectations on 
performance improvements once they discover more about the targets during the integration 
process. This allows them to update their objectives and set their sights higher and higher 
to develop the deal to its maximum potential. In order to do that, the due-diligence estimates 
need to be considered as the lowest acceptable performance improvements.  
The best acquirer is the one who is able to develop systematic institutional skills in defining its 
M&A strategy, enhancing its reputation as an acquirer, and constantly looking for new value 
creation opportunities, to improve the combined entity’s performance. 
Bruner (2002) went further with his researches and came out with a very interesting outlook on 
which are the main drivers of profitability in M&As. These are the followings: 
• Value acquiring pays, glamour acquiring does not. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) found that 
Value-oriented buyers (low book-to-market ratios) outperform glamour buyers. They 
discovered that post-acquisition underperformance by buyers was associated with 
“glamour” acquirers, so bidders focused on dealing with companies with high book-to-
market value ratios (Bruner, 2002).  
• M&A to build market power does not pay. Studies by Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), 
Mueller (1985), and Eckbo (1992) reveal that efforts to enhance market position and 
therefore to reduce the competitive forces through M&A does not improve the performance 
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of the firm combined. Moreover, Stillman (1983) and Eckbo (1983) find that share price 
movements of competitive rivals of the buyer do not conform to increases in market power 
by buyers.  
• Expected synergies are important drivers of the wealth creation through merger. 
Houston, James and Ryngaert (2001) studied the association of forecasted cost savings and 
revenue enhancements in bank mergers and found a significant relationship between the 
present value of these benefits and the announcement day returns. The market appears to 
discount the value of these benefits, however, and applies a greater discount to revenue-
enhancing synergies, and a smaller discount to cost-reduction synergies. DeLong (2003) 
also studied bank mergers and found that investors responded positively to mergers where 
one partner was inefficient, and where the merger focuses on geography, activity, and 
earnings.  
• Paying with stock is costly; paying with cash is neutral. Researches done by Koller et al. 
(2015) show that, on average, an acquirer’s stock returns surrounding the acquisition 
announcement are higher when the acquirer offers cash than when it offers shares. 
Assuming that the acquirer is not capital constrained, the real issue is whether the risks and 
rewards of the deal should be shared with the target’s shareholders. When the acquiring 
company pays in cash, its shareholders carry the entire risk of capturing synergies and 
overpaying, whereas if the companies exchange shares, the target’s shareholders assume a 
portion of the risk (Koller et al., 2015). Asquith et al. (1987) found that stock-based deals 
are associated with negative returns to the buyer’s shareholders at deal announcements, 
whereas cash deals are zero or slightly positive. This finding is consistent with theories that 
managers time the issuance of shares of stock to occur at the high point in the cycle of the 
company’s fortunes, or in the stock market cycle. Thus, the announcement of the payment 
with shares could be taken as a signal that managers believe the firm’s shares are overpriced.  
• M&A to use excess cash generally destroys value except when redeployed profitably. 
Cash-rich firms have a choice of returning the cash to investors through dividends, or 
reinvesting it through such activities as M&A. In general, M&A transactions made by firms 
with excess cash are considered as value destroying activities. However, Bruner (1988) 
reports that this action creates value. Indeed, the return to the buyers’ shareholders increases 
with the change in the buyer’s debt ratio (that was lower before the merger) due to the 
M&A.  
• When managers have more at stake, more value is created. Studies suggest that returns to 
buyer firm shareholders are associated with larger equity interests by managers and 
employees. Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) found that lower equity investment by 
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managers in their own firms was associated with higher propensity to undertake variance-
reducing acquisitions. You et al (1986) found that announcement returns to bidders were 
lower, the lower the managers’ equity stake in the buyer firm. Another interesting finding 
is that LBOs, in which managers tend to commit a high portion of their wealth in it, create 
value for buyers, not only from tax savings due to debt and depreciation shields, but also 
significantly from efficiencies and high operational improvements implemented after the 
LBO.  
2.4. Fail in crossing the finish line 
 
With the title of this section, I quote an article by Bahreini et al. (2019) from McKinsey. The 
researchers show that many large mergers and acquisitions are left before closing up the deal. 
The consequences of deal abandonment can be severe, affecting both the reputation and share 
price of the parties involved. Besides companies incurring the obvious one-off costs like 
advisory and termination fees, there is a reputational issue because senior managers in these 
businesses are often perceived as having wasted precious time and resources pursuing a 
strategic path that turned out to be a dead end (Bahreini et al., 2019). 
After having reviewed a data set of 2500 deals that were announced between 2013 and 2018 
and valued at more than €1 billion, they found that 265 canceled deals of varying sizes, 
industries, and geographies. The reasons for termination were different like for example 
interference from activist investors (about 3 percent of the deals). But the most cited obstacles 
were mismatched expectations around synergies and value creation, regulatory concerns, and 
political issues, such as the introduction of new laws that directly or indirectly affected the 
businesses involved (see Figure 3). 
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                         Figure 1: Deals are canceled for a range of reasons. 
 
            Source: McKinsey analysis 
 
In order to get deals over the finish line they suggest three core principle to be kept in mind: be 
more transparent in deal communications, anticipate trade-offs coming out of regulators’ 
concerns, and actively monitor the political landscape.  
Transparency helps to avoid misunderstandings that most of the times appear just before or 
during the due diligence stage where prices are set, and investors are looking forward to seeing 
how the process is working out. To enhance the transparency, whenever possible, it is preferable 
to have simpler structures for transactions that should be favored over more complex ones, 
either all cash, or all shares. 
Anticipate trade-offs coming out of regulatory concerns. When starting the process for an 
M&A deal it is fundamental to consider this aspect, especially for companies that have 
substantial market shares and that own important industry-standard-setting licenses, permits, 
processes, and technologies. These will inevitably attract close attention from regulatory 
agencies and therefore they need to analyze market scenarios and look at how regulators have 
treated similar industry deals in the past.  
Actively monitor the political landscape. It pays for acquirers to undertake a formal “market 
intelligence scan” early in the life cycle of the deal to get a sense of key issues relating to jobs, 
taxes, and investment trends in relevant regions or countries, making use of external-
communications and investor-relations professionals in the company. This because 
governments may want to interfere in the deals for national security issues (particularly in 
sensitive industries such as defense) and financial concerns (for instance, keeping a large 
employer in a structurally weak region) (Bahreini et al., 2019). 
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The reasons for M&A failures are not perfectly framed and limited because of the fact that the 
deals could be affected by numerous factors and risks that could be many like operational risks, 
market risks, counterparty risks, etc. Among a wide range of causes, Petitt and Ferris (2013) 
exhibit five principal explanations for value destruction due to errors occurring in the due 
diligence investigation, in the bidding process, or in the post-acquisition integration of the target 
(Petitt et al., 2013). These are: 
• Overestimation of the target’s value primarily caused by an overestimation of the growth 
and/or market potential (a forecasting error problem). 
• Overestimation of the expected synergies (another forecasting error problem). 
• Overbidding and overpayment, which is often a consequence of management’s hubris. 
This risk increases when several bidders are competing for the target because this 
heightened competition gives the target more bargaining power to negotiate a higher offer 
price and, thus, premium. 
• Failure to undertake a thorough due diligence of the target. 
• Failure to successfully integrate the target after the merger or the acquisition (Petitt et al., 
2013). 
In his “Deals from Hell”, Bruner (2005) stresses the attention on the other side of the coin, in 
the sense that every bidder should concentrate on the pragmatic strength of research before 
approaching to a deal. He believes that all M&A is local, since the practical value of M&A 
research lies in the insights it offers about the local conditions associated with the creation or 
destruction of value. Therefore, he thinks it is all about really drilling through the various 
aspects that characterize the whole environment in which the deal is taking place. Applying a 
critical thinking is fundamental for executives in order to tilt the odds of success in their favor. 
Bruner suggests some situations in which the transactions (from the bidder’s perspective) is 
more likely to fail. These are the following: 
1. When the organization enters a fundamentally unprofitable industry or refuses to exit from 
one. It is very important for a CEO not to be blotted out when listening to assertion about 
“strategic” value of an M&A transaction, in order to avoid some pitfalls like glamour 
acquisition, that in the short term would seem profitable, while might be value destroying 
in the long run. Therefore, a constant rethinking and research about positioning the firm in 
the most strategy way is required in order to boost the profitability. 
2. When the organization steps far away from what it knows. As stated before, focus and 
relatedness pay better than unrelated diversification. But this is not necessarily a rule, 
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because it could be that a company is specialized in managing a portfolio of unrelated 
businesses. Therefore, in more general terms, what matters is that a company keep focusing 
in what it is good at and put in practice what it knows better. 
3. When the economic benefits of the deal are improbable or not incremental to the deal. 
Entering into the deep meaning of M&A process being aware that is fundamental not to 
think “at the margin” by asking what new flows of cash an acquisition will trigger or to 
imagine benefits that are highly improbable and treat them as likely. Indeed, if the investors 
have the perception of a “too far too be good” deal, that is hard to achieve in terms of value 
creation, they would heavily discount it. 
4. When the bidder fails to seek some economic advantage. Bruner (2005) suggests that in 
very competitive contexts, like auctions or in purchasing public companies, it is more likely 
for the buyer to pay a higher premium. The same could happen when the target has a wide 
bargaining power, like in the case of a cross boarder transaction, because of entry barriers, 
knowledge of local markets and customs, and market power.  
5. When the organization is not very creative in deal structuring. The returns on even a 
mediocre deal can be enhanced for the buyer through a powerful deal design., through the 
use of cash, debt financing, tax shields, staged payments, merger-of-equals terms, and 
earnout. In particular, an earnout agreement is a financial contract whereby a portion of the 
purchase price of a company is to be paid in the future, contingent on realizing the future 
earnings level or some other performance measure agreed on earlier. It may also be used to 
retain and motivate key target firm managers (DePamphilis, 2018). Bruner (2005) proved 
that the returns to buyers are higher when the payment is structured like this, compared to 
the returns in straight cash or straight stock deals and are larger in cases where the target’s 
management stays. In this sense, earnouts and other contingent payment structures can be 
viewed as providing stronger performance incentives for selling managers as well as a risk 
management device for the buyer (Bruner, 2005). The mergers of equal, instead, combine 
partners of roughly equal influence without the payment of a premium by one party to the 
other. They are typically mergers effected by an exchange of shares with a low or zero 
implied acquisition premium. Bruner (2005) found that, premiums in these deals are 
typically much smaller than those in other deals and also the absence of dominance of one 
side over the other, reduces the resistance in the target company, being beneficial for a better 
post-merger integration. 
6. When the organization has poor checks, balances, and incentives. With this last concept 
Bruner (2005) sends a clear message to the top management of the buyer company, inviting 
them to ask themselves a simple but concise question: “do you have skin in the game?”. 
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No deal would cross the finish line if the board of directors is not keen on the proper 
delegation of decision authority. Moreover, the top executives should lead the team to think 
like investors, focusing on what really could enhance the returns for the entrenched players. 
At the end, in literature there is not a univocal answer to establish if an M&A pays or not. It all 
depends on several factors that characterize each specific case and play a role that many times 
could lead to ambiguous situations. According to Bruner (2002), an M&A: 
• Does pay. This answer is certainly justified for shareholders of target firms. Also, studies 
of targets and buyers combined seem to suggest these transactions create some joint value. 
But for bidders alone, there is no clear value creation; except for 20-30% of the deals, in 
the sense of earning returns significantly in excess of the opportunity cost of capital.  
• Doesn’t pay. This is true if the focus is only on bidders and define “pay” as creating material 
and significant abnormal value - this line of reasoning is behind statements that 60-70% of 
all M&A transactions “fail.” But as it has been stated before the concept of failure is all a 
matter of how we define it, in fact investors should be satisfied if they earn their required 
return. Therefore, for Bruner (2002) the popular definition of failure is extreme. So, if we 
remain coherent with this view it can be stated that the 60-70% of all M&A transactions are 
associated with financial performance that at least compensates investors for their 
opportunity cost, and therefore the buyers earns at least what they need not to destroy value.  
• It depends. Value is created by focus, relatedness, and adherence to strategy. Diversification 
(especially conglomerate), size maximization, empire building, and hubris destroy value. 
The key implication of these insights is that managers can make choices that materially 
influence the profitability of M&A, especially in dealing with integration post- merger. This  
has a huge impact on the performance of the combined company in order to create real value 
and a competitive advantage that can be sustainable over the time. (Bruner, 2002) 
To conclude, Bruner (2002) stated that “M&As do pay, but the buyer in M&A transactions 
must prepare to be disappointed. The distribution of announcement returns is wide, and the 
mean is close to zero”. As it has been said by the Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman: “there is 
no free lunch”. This would be caveat emptor for the buyer in the sense that he must be aware 
that M&A is not always a money machine and “may well not offer the major career-building 
event you wanted”. 
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3.  EM in M&As: theoretical description of the phenomenon 
A phenomenon that has more and more been discussed in literature in the past few years is 
“EM”. This section provides an analysis of the various theories around the phenomenon and 
the motivations leading to its application. Reference will be made to the most widely used 
manipulation techniques and how this practice could be used in M&As deals. Finally, in this 
section will be treated an overview of the most important statistical models developed in the 
academic context, to study the possible presence of opportunistic behavior by managers.  
Mohanram defines EM as an “intentional misstatement of financial statements” (Mohanram, 
2003, p. 1). In finance and accounting literature there are several definitions of EM, and it has 
been defined in many different ways, the differences in definition between researcher and 
academics reflect their opinion and hypotheses to explain the phenomenon, and motivations 
stand behind, as well as their own perceptions regarding the extent of such behaviour (Arkan, 
2015). Schipper conceives EM as the targeted manipulation of disclosure in the financial 
reporting process by managers or shareholders having a particular interest in the company, with 
the aim of obtaining personal gain, in contrast to what should be the merely neutral function of 
this process (Schipper, 1989, p. 92). So, this definition is mainly based on the existence of 
information asymmetry in the “Principal-Agent” relationship (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In 
this case, the “principal” is represented by the shareholder who provides capital to the company 
and does not have information that is clearly available to the agent, i.e. the manager who is 
responsible for managing these resources (Arkan, 2015).  
According to Healy & Wahlen (1999), “Earnings management occurs when managers use 
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports either 
to mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or 
to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” (Healy & 
Wahlen, 1999). This definition also emphasizes the opportunistic perspective of those who 
perform EM and highlights both the intention to mislead the stakeholders about the company's 
real economic performance, and the influence on the contractual consequences that depends on 
the accounting data reported. This definition refers above all to those contractual relationships, 
such as the remuneration contracts of the TMT (Top Management Team) and in particular of 
the CFO, which has the access to  substantial internal information; or debt contracts for which 
it is necessary not to exceed certain limits in order not to incur penalties (the so-called debt 
covenants). 
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Fields et al. (2001) state that we are in the presence of EM when “when managers exercise their 
discretion over accounting numbers with or without restrictions. Such discretion can be either 
firm value maximizing or opportunistic” (Fields et al., 2001).  Ronen and Yaari (2008) present 
an alternative definition of EM: “EM is a set of managers’ decisions that consists in not 
“knowingly” reporting the real situation and company performance in the short term, boosting 
the profits based on their discretion” (Ronen & Yaari, 2008). According to Ronen and Yaari, 
there is an objective result that could have been obtained from the neutral and appropriate 
application of the accounting principles and the managers are aware of this result, so if they 
have interests in concealing it, they are, in fact, “manipulating the profits” (Arkan, 2015). Then, 
depending on the purpose, these authors distinguish EM into beneficial, neutral or pernicious 
and explain the phenomenon by outlining a further classification, differentiating the EM under 
three labels: 
• “White”: if the EM is used by taking advantage of the flexibility in the choice of accounting 
treatments, to communicate to external investors truthful internal information of which only 
managers are aware; 
• “Gray”: if the EM is exercised by implementing an accounting treatment that could appear 
to be “opportunistic”, by maximizing only the interests of the directors; 
•  “Black”: when the EM is intended as a group of techniques designed to distort or, in any 
case, reduce the transparency of financial reports (Arkan, 2015). 
Arthur Levitt (1998), president of the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), argues that 
EM can take five different forms: 
1. “Big Bath”: when companies present much lower profits than their peers, they could have 
an incentive to further worsen the results shown in the financial statements. First because, 
given the situation, it is unlikely for the company to reach the desired threshold; secondly, 
if the results are much lower than the set target, the costs of making the situation appear 
even worse are minimal (Mohanram, 2003). Typically, companies implement this technique 
by reporting higher restructuring costs during periods of structural change, as these costs 
are meant to be one-time expenses and, therefore, the negative impact on the share price is 
almost nil since the cost is considered as a disposable item. Within these charges, indeed, 
costs due to production, strategic or management inefficiencies could also be included; in 
addition, a company could increase restructuring costs by including future operating costs, 
resulting in a worse operating result. For example, this could be the case of a newly hired 
manager who presents the first financial statements with a large loss and attributes the 
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responsibility for this result to the old manager, and then reports better results in the 
following years to confer merit on his management (Levitt, 1998); 
2. “Cookie jar reserves”: when companies, on the other hand, exceed targets, they may still 
have an incentive to reduce profits, also in order to prevent the so-called “ratchet effect”. It 
occurs when the estimates of results are always higher if the company performance is very 
positive, and this leads to future expectations that it is not always easy to satisfy (Mohanram, 
2003). EM, in this case, is identified in a dishonest accounting practice according to which 
the periods of good financial results are used to create “profit reserves” which are used in 
negative periods to “inflate” profits and reduce their volatility. Thus, giving investors the 
misleading impression that these results are consistent with the earnings targets. Therefore, 
the term “Cookie Jar” would allude to the fact that those who use this practice immerse their 
hands in the “cookie jar” of reserves whenever they feel like to do it, causing many problems 
in the case they get discovered by external subjects (Levitt, 1998); 
3.  “Creative acquisition accounting”: occurs when there are consolidation or acquisitions 
and a significant part of the price or lower future profits are classified as research and 
development costs and, consequently, considered as one-off initial costs (“One-time 
charge”); 
4.  “Immaterial misapplication of accounting principles”: when companies report 
incorrectly, and inaccurately certain balance sheet items considered irrelevant. This practice 
is often used to increase results (“bump up” practice), when profits are very close to 
reaching a certain target, so that the company meets the expectations of investors; 
5.  “Premature recognition of revenue”: When companies report profits before sales have 
actually been completed or made, before delivery of the product to the customer or when 







 - 30 - 
Dechow and Skinner (2000) claim that there is no fully comprehensive definition of EM, yet 
they aim to mark the distinction between EM and fraudulent accounting (see Figure 1): 
 
         Figure 2: The distinction between Fraud and EM 
 
          Source: Dechow & Skinner (2000) 
 
Each definition highlights two common aspects in the ways in which profits are manipulated: 
• The first underlines how EM is characterized by a series of actions taken by managers with 
the specific purpose of altering the figures in the financial statements. It follows that the 
EM is different from unintentional errors that could be made, for example in the reporting 
of balance sheet data. 
• The second characteristic shows that EM can be applied through the use of the company's 
accounting system or market transactions (Arkan, 2015). 
 
3.1. Reasons and application techniques of EM 
 
With their research, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) identify three main hypotheses liable to push 
managers to implement EM: 
1. The hypothesis of the bonus plan (or Capital market expectations and valuation): where 
investors and analysts estimate the value of the shares by discounting the company's future 
cash flows; to do this they use the financial data shown in the financial statements and this 
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encourages management to manipulate profits, trying to influence the short-term 
performance of the company, as well as the share price; 
2. The hypothesis of debt covenants (or contracts written in terms of “accounting numbers”): 
the reasons for entering into contracts are mainly based on the “Positive Accounting 
Theory3”. The company enters into contracts with a range of stakeholders, employees, 
suppliers, creditors and consumers, and one of the main objectives is to minimize 
contractual costs. These contracts are used by creditors and other stakeholders to protect 
themselves from the risk to not be paid back by borrowers. In fact, according to this theory, 
these “accounting numbers” are used in order to monitor the contractual agreements 
between managers and the various stakeholders (Skinner & Sloan, 2002); 
3. The hypothesis of political cost (or anti-trust or other political regulations): concerns the  
reputation of the company, so companies could be incentivized to manipulate profits in 
order to obtain greater social weight and to gain visibility in political and media field 
(Arkan, 2015). 
 
More recent researches on the phenomenon are no longer focused on the Positive accounting 
theory, but they consider reasons that are linked to the financial market as an interpretation of 
the opportunistic behavior of managers. Many researchers have highlighted the various motives 
that could incentivize managers to implement the practice of manipulating profits, and these 
can be summarized in five categories: 
 
1. Capital Market motivations: since the information transmitted through the financial 
statements influences the stocks’ price of a specific company, the desire to meet investors’ 
expectations regarding the risk and return linked to company performance could lead 
managers to manipulate results (Arkan, 2015); as shown by Skinner and Sloan (2002), the 
market response to the failure in satisfying analysts’ expectations is asymmetric: 
specifically, the so-called “market penalty” for missing 1% of expectations seems to be 
relatively greater than the “market reward” of exceeding expectations by the same amount. 
In addition to these capital market’s considerations, managers are eager to meet or exceed 
investors’ expectations also for two other reasons: firstly, to improve their reputation within 
the market labor; and secondly to enhance their reputation towards the various stakeholder 
 
3 Positive Accounting Theory makes predictions of real-world events and translate them to accounting transactions. 
While normative theories tend to recommend what should be done, Positive Theories try to explain and predict 
actions such as which accounting policies firms will choose and how firms will react to newly proposed accounting 
standards. 
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groups. By interviewing some financial executives, Graham et al. (2005) reported that 
approximately 75% of respondents agree on managers’ tendency to manipulate results to 
maintain a high reputation level. The same survey documents that around 60% of the 
interviewees agree that maintaining the reputation of the company among the interested 
parties is a push factor for EM practice. In addition, 80% of respondents believes that failure 
to achieve earnings targets signals uncertainty in the market with respect to the company’s 
forecasts, and 60% believes that failure to reach a certain target can be interpreted externally 
as a weakness. Accounting regulators expressed great concern about managers’ 
“obsessions” in meeting short-term earnings expectations (Fang Li, et al., 2009). In 2000, 
SEC President Arthur Levitt declared: “I expressed my concern that corporate America’s 
motivation to meet Wall Street earnings expectations could be overriding common sense 
business practices. The zeal to project smoother earnings from year to year cast a pall over 
the quality of the underlying numbers” (Levitt, 2000); 
2. Management compensation contract motivations: when the manager acts in conflict of 
interest with the principal, with the aim of obtaining remuneration bonuses or increasing 
his compensation often linked to the company performance (Arkan, 2015); 
3. Lending contract (loan agreement) motivations: it is linked to the hypothesis of “debt 
covenant” as creditors often impose restrictions on the payment of dividends, share 
repurchases and issue of additional debt with respect to those already reported, in order to 
guarantee the repayment of the loans by the company (Arkan, 2015); 
4.  Regulatory motivations: listed companies are generally monitored by authorities and 
subject to numerous accounting compliance rules. This could push managers to manipulate 
results in order to ensure compliance with the standards; this is the case for sectors such as 
banking, insurance and utilities (Arkan, 2015); 
5.  Political cost motivations: the companies could implement EM to show lower profits in 
order to reduce the risks of investigation and any intervention by anti-trust regulators 
(Arkan, 2015). 
Very often it is difficult to discern manipulation from accounting fraud, in fact managers have 
various techniques and methods of manipulating results without necessarily violating 
accounting regulations, and this is possible due to the accounting standards’ flexibility. In this 
sense, EM is defined as a selection of accounting techniques aimed at achieving a desired 
financial result (Fang Li et al., 2009). Accountants and managers have a wide range of methods 
and techniques of manipulating with numbers, records and statements through the flexibility of 
accounting rules and policies. The technique of EM can be defined as a method or a way of 
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selecting or violating accounting standards in order to affect financial events. EM techniques 
could take two forms (Ronen & Yaari, 2008):  
• Accounting choices  
• Accruals choices: which divided into two macro-categories: 
a. Accruals based EM 
b. Real transactions-based EM 
 
a. Accruals based EM 
Accruals represent the difference between net income and cash flows (for example, when 
companies sell items on credit, this sale forms an accrual of revenues). These are distinguished 
in: 
• Normal or expected accruals (Non-Discretionary): which occur in normal transactions 
implemented by the company relating to its performance level, business strategy, 
industrial conventions and macroeconomic events (Arkan, 2015); 
• Abnormal and unexpected Accruals (Discretionary): they occur through transactions 
and accounting treatments in order to manipulate profits, such as the evaluation of 
inventories using LIFO, FIFO and weighted average cost methods, depreciation of fixed 
assets, provisions and charges such as write-downs of real estate and receivables (Fang 
Li et al., 2009). 
Numerous researchers highlight the existence of this practice and many studies have been 
conducted on it. In particular, Fang Li et al. (2009), show how public policies affect managers’ 
use of each of these tools. They show, for example that, in the period preceding the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act, there was a greater use of manipulation based on accruals. The Sarbanes Oxley Act, 
passed in 2002 in response to the accounting scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, Arthur 
Andersen and others, is considered to be one of the most significant pieces of securities 
legislation since the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. The Act contains a number of provisions 
aimed at reducing the instances of financial accounting fraud that plagued the late 1990s and 
early 2000s (e.g., Tyco, HealthSouth, Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing). These provisions 
include 1) the establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as 
an oversight body of the public accounting industry, 2) the requirement that all CEOs and CFOs 
certify that to the best of their knowledge the financial statements are free of material 
misstatement, and 3) the prohibition of auditors from providing non-audit consulting services 
to their audit clients; to name just a few (Fang Li et al, 2009).  
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In particular, Koh et al. (2008), investigate what are the implications on the practice of EM by 
managers following the entry into force of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, and this research shows the 
evident decrease in the use of manipulation techniques of profits in the periods following the 
accounting fraud of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Furthermore, the results indicate that 
attempts to meet investor expectations in the post-Sarbanes Oxley period are more associated 
with future cash flows. This suggests that the decrease in accruals-based profit manipulation 
techniques has improved the so-called “Earnings quality” of companies, as there is a tendency 
to represent in a more trustable way the future performance (Fang Li, et al., 2009). 
With a similar outcome, Cohen et al. (2008) show an increase in EM practice in the period 
preceding the Sarbanes Oxley and a decrease during the periods following it (Cohen et al., 
2008). 
Other studies compare the presence of accrual-based EM in various countries around the world. 
Leuz et al. (2003) analyzed EM in 31 countries and noticed that manipulation activities are 
lower in those countries with large equity markets and strong regulations to protect investors 
(Leuz, et al., 2003). 
Burgstahler et al. (2006) examine the EM activities of public and private companies in 13 
countries of the European Union and find that these companies show higher profit 
manipulation, and that there is less discretionary management of profits in private and public 
companies in countries with stronger legal systems (Burgstahler et al., 2006). Shuto et al. (2007) 
investigate the relationship between EM and executive compensation for a sample of Japanese 
firms and provide evidence that managers engage in EM activities in order to increase their 
compensation (Fang Li et al., 2009). 
b. Real transactions-based EM 
On the other side of the coin of the techniques of EM accruals-based, in which managers 
manipulate the results and estimates through the accounting system, the EM based on real 
transactions concerns the timing and structuring of commercial activities in order to obtain a 
desired financial result (i.e., the timing of sales). 
Graham et al. (2005) conduct an investigation which shows that managers are willing to make 
decisions that would not be beneficial for the firm just to meet the investors’ expectations. 
Among these decisions are those to delay the costs of research and development, advertising, 
maintenance and to give up projects that would have a positive impact on the company. From 
this research, it also emerges that managers would be more likely to adopt this type of EM 
technique than the accrual-based one to achieve the desired financial result (Graham et al., 
2005). 
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Roychowdhury (2006) in his article claims that managers manipulate real activities to avoid 
reporting annual losses through various operations such as product discounts to temporarily 
increase sales, overproduction to show lower cost of sales and lower discretionary expenses to 
improve profit margins. And through a cross-sectional analysis it has been observed that these 
activities are less frequent in the presence of investors protected by stricter regulations 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Cohen et al. (2008) and Koh et al. (2008) highlight how managers are moving away from EM 
techniques based on accruals in an increasingly rigorous regulatory environment and, in 
particular, show how this choice was influenced by the entry into force of the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act (Fang Li, et al., 2009). 
 
 
3.2.  EM and M&As 
Financial economists, regulators and accountants have long recognized that managers exercise 
discretion over accounting rules to manipulate their firm’s earnings in many contexts. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, there are different types of deal structure in M&As, i.e. cash 
deals, stock deals etc., but there is a situation in which, according to the most part of researchers, 
EM is widely applied. This situation regards the stock for stock type corporate merger. As 
described by Erickson and Wang (1999), in many corporate mergers, when the transaction is 
completed, target shareholders receive a specified number of acquiring firm shares for each of 
their target shares. For these mergers, the total number of shares issued by the acquiring firm is 
determined by a negotiated exchange ratio4 agreed on by the acquirer and the target. Clearly, it 
is set in a way such that target shareholders generally receive a substantial premium above 
current market price (Erickson and Wang, 1999). As a result, the higher the price of the 
acquiring firm’s stock on the agreement date, the fewer the number of shares that must be issued 
to purchase the target firm. This mechanism provides several incentives for the acquiring firm 
to attempt to increase its share price pre-merger for at least three reasons: to minimize the 
likelihood of earnings dilution and voting power reduction in order to keep the control over the 
target, particularly manager-shareholders and , clearly to lower the cost of acquiring the target 
firm (Erickson and Wang, 1999). 
Whether EM succeeds in raising the market price of a bidder’s stock will depend on the level 
of information efficiency in the market, and whether an analyst can “see through” and “reverse 
out” the EM device employed by the bidder’s directors (Botsari and Goh, n.d.). But if the market 
 
4 The exchange ratio is equal to the number of shares of acquiring firm stock to be issued for a share of target stock. 
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is semi-strong efficient (Fama, 1970), whilst the EM is opaque to the analyst, and the bidder’s 
price is affected, then EM in such takeovers may have much more powerful economic 
consequences than in routine financial reporting (Botsari and Meeks, 2008). 
Botsari and Goh (n.d.) provide an analysis of EM by bidders in the world’s second largest 
takeover market, the London Stock Exchange, because they believe that such opportunistic 
behaviour in an M&A context can have irreversible wealth consequences for each actor 
involved. They do so by examining a range of corporate governance mechanisms to understand 
which one could restrain opportunistically driven M&A decisions. 
 Some of them are the following: 
• The Role of the Auditors: The employment of an independent external auditor to verify 
accounting numbers reported by managers is a market-induced mechanism to reduce agency 
costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, an important economic function of auditing is to 
monitor and control EM. In order for this to work, and so for EM to be detected, it is obvious 
that the quality of the audit needs to be high. Dopuch and Simunic (1982) argue that 
investors may perceive Big 4 auditors as having higher quality because these auditors have 
more of the observable characteristics associated with quality than do non-Big 4 auditors. 
Big 4 auditors are also more likely to invest in information technology and employ state-
of-the-art techniques to detect EM, less willing to accept questionable accounting practices 
and more likely to report errors and “not so safe” practices. This is due to the fact that have 
more to lose in the event of a loss of reputation and thus greater incentives to protect their 
brand name and even screen out disreputable client (Botsari and Goh, n.d.). Becker et al. 
(1998) find that clients of non-Big 6 auditors report discretionary accruals that are on 
average 1.5 to 2.1 percent of total assets higher than the discretionary accruals reported by 
clients of Big 4 auditors.  
• Board Composition: An important function of the board of directors is to reduce costs that 
come from the separation of ownership and decision control of the modern corporation 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). The board of directors receives its authority for internal control 
and other decisions from stockholders of corporations. To this extend, three are the specific 
aspects that need to be considered: The Role of Non-Executive Directors, the board size and 
the effect of the CEO Duality. Starting with the first one, it can be said that corporate boards 
generally include outside members who are called to mitigate disagreements among internal 
managers and ratify decisions regarding serious agency problems (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) suggest that stockholders value the inclusion of outside 
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directors on boards as evidenced by a positive stock price reaction at the announcement of 
the appointment of an additional outside director, but they also suggest that outside directors 
are chosen in the interest of shareholders. Botsari and Goh (n.d.) highlight how also the 
Cadbury report published in 1992 reflected the fact that non-executive directors can 
enhance corporate governance mechanisms. The Cadbury Report, titled Financial Aspects 
of Corporate Governance, is a report issued by “The Committee on the Financial Aspects 
of Corporate Governance” chaired by Adrian Cadbury that, among all the 
recommendations, it states that UK boards should contain at least three outside directors, 
and that these should be “independent of management and free from any business or other 
relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of their independent 
judgement, apart from their fees and shareholding”(Botsari and Goh, n.d.). The market’s 
reaction suggests that the higher the percentage of non-executive directors on the board, the 
higher the probability of a profitable acquisition, since non-executives are more likely to 
take decisions consistent with shareholder value maximization. In a study of a sample of 
firms subject to accounting enforcement actions by the Securities Exchange Commission, 
Dechow et al. (1996) find that these firms employ more income-increasing accounting 
procedures, have higher total accruals and higher estimated discretionary accruals, and are 
more likely to have a board of directors dominated by insiders. On the other hand, as 
Sudarsanam (2000) notes, since the pool of potential non-executive directors is often limited 
to the top management of companies, there is scope of cross-board memberships with the 
CEO of one firm being on the board of another and vice versa. Thus, non-executive directors 
may not act following an unbiased attitude. Furthermore, they are not so motivated in 
monitoring EM practices because of lack of incentives and interests in something that does 
not really have a direct impact on their wealth. 
The second aspect to be considered, according to Botsari and Goh (n.d.) is the Board Size, 
since many researchers argue that having a too large board of directors in term of size turns 
to be very inefficient. Particularly, Jensen (1993) states that “as groups increase in size, they 
become less effective because the co-ordination and process problems overwhelm the 
advantages from having more people to draw on”. Jensen (1993) states that the optimal 
board size is seven to eight people, because “when boards get beyond seven or eight people, 
they are less likely to function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control”. In other 
terms, the more members on the board, the weaker the board’s monitoring function.  
Finally, regarding the Effect of the CEO Duality, Jensen (1993) suggests that CEO and 
Chairman of the board be separated to reinforce the function of the board. This view is also 
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reflected in Cadbury Report’s (1992) recommendation to split the two roles in order to 
improve board independence because having both in the same person embodying the two 
roles could lead to concentration of power and possible conflicts of interest, potentially 
reducing the level of monitoring.  
• Managerial Ownership: According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the costs of deviation 
from value-maximisation decrease as there is an increase in the management ownership. 
They sustain the “convergence-of-interest hypothesis” which states that the higher the 
managerial ownership in a company, the better will be the firm’s performance, as managers 
are more focused to convert resources to realize value maximizing projects. On the other 
hand, Morck et al. (1988) exhibit that substantial levels of managerial ownership could lead 
to “entrenchment”, that is the pursue of self-interests, since it is more difficult for external 
shareholders to really have a clear view and full control on managers’ plans. Following the 
same wave, Stulz (1988) models the M&A process as a game between managers and an 
outside bidder vying for the voting rights of few shareholders. Increases in managerial 
ownership force the outside bidder to pay higher premiums and if this premium is too high 
it could be unprofitable for the bidder resulting in an M&A transaction that – using Bruner’s 
term – does not pay. Therefore, the higher is the managerial ownership, the higher the 
premium that the bidder must offer, and accordingly this will result in a lower probability 
that the bidder will make an offer in the end. This shows that a too large managerial 
ownership could prevent the realization of value creating activities, such as cases of 
profitable M&As, when managers want to keep their position afraid to lose control on the 
target firm.  
The incentives for acquiring firms to increase reported accounting earnings preceding a stock 
for stock merger should be an increasing function of the economic benefits that can be generated 
from such strategic behaviour (Erickson and Wang, 1999). Because of the fact that EM is not 
costless, if the size of the target is relatively small compared to the size of the acquiring firm, 
the economic benefits from increasing stock price via manipulated earnings will also be 
relatively small and therefore there is no incentive to risk and manipulate earnings this case 
(Botsari and Goh, n.d.). Erickson and Wang (1999) find that an acquiring firm’s EM magnitude, 
as proxied by the level of discretionary accruals, is an increasing function of the deal ratio 
(defined as the ratio of the deal’s market value to the market value of the acquiring firm’s 
equity). Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) classify the costs associated with EM into two broad 
categories: the costs of detected EM, and the costs of undetected EM. Costs under the first 
category include enforcement actions by the regulatory bodies, earnings restatements, 
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shareholder litigation, qualified audit reports, and negative coverage in the business press. All 
these situations are associated with significant negative abnormal returns for the firm caught to 
manipulate earnings. Costs under the second category include: 
• A possible reversal of the accruals and the impact that it could have on the future reported 
figures and therefore a negative impact on the share price in the future. As reported by 
Teoh et al. (1998), for example, negative unexpected accruals following equity offerings 
coincide with stock price declines over the same time period, suggesting that investors 
assess these reversals in a very strict way, thus boosting the cost of undetected EM to the 
company.  
• Constraints on the firm’s future reporting flexibility. In particular, EM in a previous 
accounting period necessarily constrains the firm’s ability to manage earnings in the current 
period. Some researchers demonstrate that firms with overvalued assets, which proxies for 
prior optimism in financial reporting, are less likely to report larger positive or smaller 
negative earnings surprises. In other words, one cost of managing earnings today is a 
decreased ability to manage earnings tomorrow, regardless of whether the EM is explicitly 
revealed to the public (Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004).  
• Audit costs, since the firm may need to undertake additional audit procedures to mitigate 
audit risk. Indeed, income-increasing accruals are positively associated with the likelihood 
of a lawsuit caused by audit failure, which may indirectly increase audit fees.  
•  A decrease in the perceived earnings quality, as high levels of accruals result in a decreased 
magnitude in the correlation between earnings and cash flows, a commonly used measure 
of earnings quality). 
• A higher probability of detection, given that the extent to which managers engage in EM 
increases the likelihood that their actions will eventually be uncovered. Beneish (1999) 
finds a positive association between total accruals and the probability that a firm will be the 
target of an SEC enforcement action. Further, after controlling for total accruals, he finds 
that disproportionate increases in receivables relative to sales, which likely indicates 
revenue inflation, also are a significant predictor of an SEC enforcement action. This view 
is aligned with the one of Dechow et al. (1996), according to which the SEC is more likely 
to detect EM that occurs through revenue inflation than through other methods, thereby 
increasing its potential costs. 
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3.3. Detecting EM: statistical models 
 
The corporate literature has extensively dealt with the issue of EM through the development of 
statistical and operational models that were able to capture its presence and assess its impact 
and size. In particular, the models analyzed here are those based on the analysis of aggregate 
accruals, considering the discretionary and non-discretionary component. 
Among those, the most frequently mentioned are: 
 
• Healy Model (1985) 
• De Angelo Model (1986) 
• Jones Model (1991) 
• Industry Model - Dechow and Sloan (1991) 
• Modified Jones Model (1995) 
 
Most of the models require that there should be at least one parameter to be estimated and this 
is typically done by considering an “estimation period”, during which it is assumed an absence 
of systematic manipulation (Dechow et al., 1995). 
 
3.3.1. Healy Model 
 
The Healy model studies the presence of EM by comparing the total accruals (divided by the 
total assets of the year t-1) with respect to a partitioning variable (PART), i.e. a dummy variable 
that divides the data being analyzed into two groups, which is equal to 1 when EM is expected 
in response to a stimulus identified by the researcher (“Event Period”), and is equal to 0 when 
there is no systematic manipulation of the results (“Estimation Period”). The Healy Model 
differs substantially from the others, in that it assumes that the EM is implemented 
systematically, and therefore in every period. In this case, the PART variable divides the data 
set into three groups, considering the manipulation of profits upwards in one of the three groups 
and downwards in the remaining two groups. Therefore, the average of the total accruals of the 
group in which there is an upward manipulation of profits is compared with the average of the 
total accruals of the group in which it is expected a downward manipulation. This approach is 
equivalent to considering the group of observations for which upward manipulations are 
expected as an “estimation period” and the set of observations for which a downward 
manipulation of profits is expected as an “event period” (Dechow et al., 1995, p. 197). 
The average of the total accruals detected in the estimation period therefore represents the 
measure of non-discretionary accruals and the model is as follows: 






NDA are the estimated non-discretionary accruals; 
TA are equal to the total accruals divided for the total asset at t-1 
T=1, 2...T is the year included in the “estimation period” 
 is the year included in the “event period” (Dechow et al., 1995). 
 
Healy considers earnings as the breakdown between the cash flows derived from operations 
and total accruals: 
Eit = CFit + TAit 
 
And he calculates TA using the following equation:  
 
∆CAit − ∆CLit − ∆CASHit + ∆STDit − DEPit 
 
CA is the change in current assets from t-1 to t; 
CL is the change in current liabilities from t-1 to t; 
CASH is the cash flow for the period of analysis; 
STD is the long-term matured debt; 
DEP represents the depreciation and write-down costs for the period t.  
 
In Healy’s model, therefore, discretionary accruals are given by the difference between total 
accruals and non-discretionary accruals. Therefore, if the discretionary accruals are high, the 
model detects the presence of EM. 
The limits of this model consist in the assumption of constant non-discretionary accruals over 
time and that there is no EM in the period of analysis (Riccardo, 2016). 
 
3.3.2. De Angelo Model 
De Angelo’s model can be seen as a particular case of Healy’s model, in which the estimate 
period for non-discretionary accruals is limited to the observation of the previous year. 
NDAτ = TAτ−1 
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What this model has in common with Healy’s is the use of total accruals from the estimate 
period as a proxy to calculate the expected non-discretionary accruals: but this model only 
works when the non-discretionary accruals are constant and the discretionary ones have an 
average of 0 in the estimation period, otherwise the estimate would present errors. The use of 
the De Angelo model rather than that of Healy depends on the trend followed by the non-
discretionary accruals that results from the analysis of the time series: if these follow a "random 
walk" trend, then the De Angelo model is more suitable; otherwise, if the non-discretionary 
accruals follow a "white noise" trend around the average then the Healy model will prove more 
appropriate. 
But both models have limits, in particular the omission of other important variables for the 
company and the assumption of constant non-discretionary accruals (Dechow et al., 1995). 
 
3.3.3. Jones Model 
 
Jones' model overcomes the assumption that non-discretionary accruals are constant over time 
and is mathematically represented by the formula: 
 
NDAτ = a1(1 Aτ−1) + a2(∆REVτ) + a3(PPEτ)⁄  
 
Where, 
REV  are the revenues of year t minus revenues of year t-1 (divided by the total assets t-1); 
PPE are the tangible fixed assets of year t before depreciation (divided by the total assets t-1); 
A-1 total assets at t-1; 
a1, a2, a3 firm- specific parameters. 
 
The estimates of the company specific parameters α are obtained through the model in the 
estimation period (which assumes no EM): 
 
TAτ = a1(1 Aτ−1) + a2(∆REVτ) + a3(PPEτ) + υτ⁄  
 
where the total accruals are divided by the total assets at time t-1 and the parameters a, i.e. the 
estimates of α, are obtained with the OLS method. 
An implicit assumption of this model is the NON discretionality of revenues, therefore it omits 
many of the manipulations of discretionary revenues and this determines an estimate of the EM 
that most of the times tends to 0 (Dechow, et al., 1995). 
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3.3.4. The Industry Model 
 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) developed this model which argues the hypothesis on which the 
Jones model was built, that is the assumption of constant non-discretionary accruals over time. 
This model, on the other hand, assumes that the variation in the determinants of non-
discretionary accruals are common for companies of the same sector. For non-discretionary 
accruals it is equal to: 
 
NDAτ = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛1(𝑇𝐴𝜏) 
 
Median1(TAt) = the median value of total accruals scaled by lagged assets for all non-sample 
firms in the same 2-digit SIC code5. The firm specific parameters y1, and y2 are estimated using 
OLS on the observations on the estimated period. 
But even this model has limitations in that it does not consider the variation in non-discretionary 
accruals that is common among companies in the same sector and this could cause distorted 
estimates; moreover, it removes the same industry. The severity of this problem depends on the 






5 The use of two-digit SIC levels represents a trade-off between defining industry groupings narrowly enough that the Industry 
Model captures the industry specific effects versus having enough firms in each industry grouping so that the model can 
effectively diversify firm-specific effects.  
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3.3.5. Modified Jones Model 
In this model, non-discretionary accruals are estimated during the “event period” (when the 
presence of EM is assumed) in the following way: 
NDAτ = a1(1 Aτ−1) + a2(∆REVτ − ∆RECτ) + a3(PPEτ)⁄  
Where ΔRECτ = net receivables in year τ minus net receivables in year τ − 1 scaled by total assets 
τ − 1. It is important to note that the estimates of α1, α2 and α3 are those obtained from the original 
Jones Model, not from the modified model. The only adjustment relative to the original Jones 
Model is that the change in revenues is adjusted for the change in receivables in the event period 
(i.e., in the year EM is hypothesized). 
The original Jones Model implicitly assumes that discretion is not exercised over revenues in 
either the estimation period or the event period. The modified version of the Jones Model 
implicitly assumes that all changes in receivables in the event period result from EM. This is 
based on the reasoning that it is easier to manage earnings by exercising discretion over the 
recognition of revenue on receivables than on cash sales. If this modification is successful, then 
the estimate of EM should no longer be biased toward zero in samples where EM has taken 
place through the management of revenues (Dechow et al., 1995). 
 
In this section, we have outlined what are the key concepts regarding the EM phenomenon by 
analyzing the characteristics, reasons and techniques through which manipulation can manifest 
itself, especially in case of an M&A deal. Furthermore, we also drilled through some of the 
most important statistical models widely used in literature for the detection of EM practices and 
we continue in the next chapter with an in-depth analysis on the use of a more pragmatic 
method, that is Penman’ approach. This will help us to conduct an empirical study on a real 
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4.   Penman’s approach to conduct the empirical analysis  
 
Technical and fundamental analysis are the two main schools of thought regarding financial 
market analysis. The substantial difference between the two is represented by the fact that the 
first looks at the movements of the share price and uses these data to predict future changes; 
the second evaluates the shares, attempting to identify their intrinsic value by examining the 
economic, financial, quantitative and qualitative factors that influence the market and the firm 
(or “the market valuation”). The technical analysis typically starts from the graphs relating to 
the financial trends to make forecasts on stock price changes, while the fundamental analysis 
mainly deals with the financial statements of a company, and in particular, the income 
statement, the balance sheet, cash flow statement and other types of disclosure to find out the 
intrinsic value of the company. So, if the latter assumes a long-term orientation, the technical 
analysis takes a short view horizon: in fact, while the stocks charts can be determined for short 
periods (weeks, days or even minutes), the fundamental analysis refers to data which are 
generated much more slowly than the stocks’ price, main object of observation of the technical 
analysis (Kuepper, 2018). 
 
Focusing on the fundamentalist approach, which “anchors” itself to the financial statements 
analysis of companies to make forecasts, it becomes relevant to verify the quality of the 
information provided by these documents. As it has been previously stated, accounting 
techniques can be used to “package” the company and its value, making it appear better (or 
worse) than it really is. The quality analysts assume the role of “discarders” of this package, 
and in case of anomalies and EM, they are appointed to warn stakeholders (Penman, 2013). 
From now on it will be presented the approach to “Quality Analysis” studied and implemented 
by Penman. Its principal scope is to verify the degree of accounting quality in financial 
statements and in the disclosure reported by the companies. This is an operational approach that 
differs from the purely statistical one, analyzed in the previous section, which does not presume 
to solve the problem, but to diagnose it and raise suspicions in case of risk of manipulation. 
 
Penman (2013) highlights a fundamental concept: “An accounting quality is imperative because 
of the reversal property of accounting: Earnings induced by accounting methods always reverse 
in the future” (Penman, 2013, p. 591). So, for example, if the estimated bad debts are too low 
(and the estimated profits too high), the costs for the bad debt of these credits may be too high 
in the future (drastically lowering the profits); or if the depreciation rate is too low, it may result 
to be higher in the future, or the company may find itself forced to reduce the value of the asset 
 - 46 - 
or detect a loss deriving from the sale of this asset. Therefore “Earnings are good quality if they 
do not reverse” (Penman, 2013). In fact, if the quality of the profits represented in the financial 
statements is low and does not conform to a criterion of truthfulness and correctness, it could 
lead to weak forecasts and valuations, exposing investors to the risk of finding themselves 
towards the so-called “Torpedo”, a sudden drop in shares’ price resulting from the discovery of 
results manipulation. 
 
4.1.  Accounting Quality: five questions that the analyst should ask himself 
 
Checking the quality of the information reported in the financial statements is something that 
should be considered as a very relevant issue, especially when an M&A deal is in place. For 
this reason, when facing this kind of situation, Penman argues that the analyst should be able 
to answer to five questions: 
 
1. GAAP Quality: is GAAP accounting deficient? The analyst wonders if GAAPs are able to 
capture, from an accounting point of view, the relevant characteristics of a company; 
 
2. Audit Quality: is the company violating GAAP or committing accounting fraud? GAAPs 
may be appropriate but, at the same time, may not be applied in compliance with the 
regulatory standards. To this regard, as it has already been said in the previous section, there 
are agencies that embody a function of control, such as the aforementioned SEC (Security 
and Exchange Commission) and the PCAOB (Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board). Therefore, the analyst is faithful to the audit, but must always take into 
consideration the presence of potential manipulations by managers who try to “opacify the 
results” or corrupt auditors who facilitate the occurrence of such situations. In addition, 
Penman points out that the GAAPs are, by nature, particularly suitable for making “form 
over substance” prevail, thereby invalidating the “true and fair” representation of a 
company's financial, accounting and economic situation; 
 
3. GAAP application quality: Does the company use GAAP to manipulate results? GAAPs 
reduce the number of accounting methods that can be used but, at the same time, allow 
some discretion in their choice. This discretion could be seen by managers as a sort of 
“manipulation license” in order to obtain the desired results, especially when considering 
estimates regarding, for example, the useful life of assets, bad debts, guarantee costs, 
pensions, restructuring costs and maintenance costs, etc.; 
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4. Transaction Quality: is the company manipulating its results to adapt to accounting 
criteria? A company could faithfully stick to compliance with GAAP, but at the same time, 
“arrange and plan” its accounting transactions in order to achieve its desired objectives. 
This is a type of real manipulation, which is carried out through the actual business’ side of 
the company and not just using the mere accounting one. It can take two forms: 
a. Transaction Timing: is carried out through a shift of the moment in which the 
transactions occur to influence the operating result and, in this sense, involves the period 
in which the revenues and costs are reported. Revenue timing, known as channel stuffing, 
times transactions around revenue recognition rules.  Typically, GAAPs require revenues 
to be recognized when goods are delivered, and services are performed. This principle 
would favor the practice of manipulating profits in two possible directions: increasing 
them, in the event that the products were delivered before the end of the period in 
question; or postponing the reporting, thus delaying the delivery.                     
Instead, as far as the costs are concerned, the period in which they are reported could be 
subject to manipulation to increase the profit, for example through the deferral of R&D 
and advertising costs that would be charged to the following year (whereas advancing 
them to the current period would be used to decrease income for the future); 
 
b. Transaction Structuring: it puts in place the prevalence of the form over the substance, 
so that transactions are arranged in the best form to be treated in a certain way through 
the accounting principles, but in substance they could reveal themselves to be 
inconsistent; 
5. Disclosure quality: Is the information made available by the company suitable to disclose 
its characteristics in an exhaustive manner? The information takes different forms and 
takes place through the financial statements, notes, market analyzes, discussions of 
managers and it is essential for investors in order to better know the legal entity they deal 
with. There are four types of “disclosure” that are fundamental to conduct a proper 
company’s valuation: 
a. The disclosure that distinguish operating from financial figures in statements; 
b. The disclosure that distinguishes profitability deriving from the company’s operations 
from that deriving from extraordinary components; 
c. The disclosure showing the drivers of the company’s core profitability; 
d. The disclosure that verifies if there is consistency between the accounting used and the 
quality of application of the GAAP. 
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We can therefore conclude that “without adequate disclosures it is difficult to forecast from a 
good measure of current core operating income, so low-quality disclosures lead to low-quality 
valuations” (Penman, 2013). 
 
 
4.2. Key aspects to consider in order to conduct the analysis. 
Before conducting the empirical analysis on the quality of reports, it is reasonable to clarify 
which elements could be subject to any form of manipulation. In general, financial statements 
contain estimates and valuations. This entails, in the majority of cases, the presence, even 
minimal, of speculation. According to Penman (2013) “there is a tension in accounting: To 
remedy the defects of cash accounting, accrual accounting adds estimates, but these estimates 
inevitably add some speculation. Unbiased management and unbiased auditors constrain the 
speculation, but unfortunately, these agents are not always to be relied on”. (Penman, 2013). 
As a starting point for the analysis, Penman defines the operating income as the sum of the two 
“hard” and “soft” components. Moreover, it has been noted how the manipulation of profits 
through estimates and accounting methods always leaves a trail, since the changes in items in 
the income statement have an impact on the items in the financial statements. Indeed, higher 
revenues could result from an increase in receivables (an asset) or a decrease in deferred income 
(liabilities), and lower costs could result from an increase in prepaid expenses (an asset), or a 
decrease in accrued expenses (liabilities) (Penman, 2013). So, for this research we rely on the 
classification made by Penman (2013) on operating income and, in particular of its components, 
to understand on which of them the practice of EM has a direct impact and leaves a trail: 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 =  𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤  +  𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝑂𝐼 =         𝐶 –  𝐼           +  𝛥𝑁𝑂𝐴 
 
 
                                                                  Hard                Soft 
 
Where:  
C represents “Cash flow from operations” and 
I represents the “Cash flow from Investments”. 
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The soft part, that potentially is the easiest one to be manipulated, is made up of ΔNOA. We 
define NOA as the set of all the assets of a company that are directly related to operational 
management minus all operating liabilities. 
More precisely, it can be calculated as follows: 
+ 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 
− 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
− 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
+ 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
               =  𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠    (Bragg, 2017) 
A high increase in NOA leads to an increase in the operating income (OI). Free cash flow 
is hard which means that it cannot be easily affected by the accounting. The soft part of 
operating income that has to be challenged is the ΔNOA. A big increase in NOA creates 
operating income and a higher current RNOA0 but results in a high NOA0 that becomes the base 
for next year's RNOA 6: RNOA1 = OI1/NOA0. Accordingly, RNOA1 declines if NOA0 has been 
inflated (Penman, 2013, p. 597).  
More specifically it is possible to investigate directly the equation representing the “sort” part 
in the operating income: 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 =  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 +  𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠  
    𝛥𝑁𝑂𝐴      =      𝐼     +  𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠  
This equation highlights how the analyst can investigate on the possible presence of 
manipulation going through two aspects: the component represented by investments and the 
one represented by accruals. In particular, regarding the investments, it is important to check 
whether these have been subject to a correct capitalization or not. For example, if investments 
in PPE are reported in a proper way in the balance sheet, but a firm capitalizes periodic repairs 
and maintenance in PPE, it increases current earnings and reduces future earnings through 
higher depreciation charges. This same result occurs by recognizing too much prepaid expense, 
 
6 Return on Net Operating Assets 
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allocating too much cost to inventories, capitalizing promotion costs, and capitalizing the costs 
of acquiring customers (Penman, 2013, p. 598).  
As far as the second route is concerned, this is about checking the presence of EM by looking 
at the accruals, namely the difference between net income and cash from operations in the cash 
flow from operations section, such as the allowances for bad debts, allowances for sales returns, 
deferred revenues, warranty accruals, accrued expenses, and pensions liabilities. 
According to Penman (2013), before starting an analysis on the quality of the information 
reported in the financial statements, the analyst must be able to capture four fundamental 
aspects: 
• The business; 
• The accounting policy; 
• The business areas in which the accounting policies adopted appear more controversial and 
raise suspicion of manipulation; 
• Situations in which management is particularly tempted to manipulate (Penman, 2013, p. 
598). 
 
Regarding the accounting policy, it represents a “benchmark” for the firm, useful for identifying 
any variation that could be an indication of manipulation. The accounting policy adopted can 
be conservative, liberal or neutral. This is an aspect captured by the information reported in the 
footnotes, which integrates particularly important details not directly explained in the income 
statement or in the balance sheet. The policy used determines the level of current and future 
RNOA.  
This permanent effect does not frustrate the valuation, but deviations from the policy may be 
manipulations. Penman (2013) suggests paying particular attention to those companies that 
adopt accounting policy that are considerably different from the standard for the same sector; 
but also, to companies whose valuations and accounting estimates have been incorrect in the 
past (Penman, 2013). 
 
Finally, with the last of the four aspects, Penman (2013) lists various situations in which 
manipulation is more likely to occur, by distinguishing them in “institutional” conditions and 
“accounting and financial statements” conditions.  
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Institutional conditions include cases where: 
• The company is carrying out a process of raising capital or renegotiating borrowing. The 
moment of greatest risk is before an initial public offering (IPO); 
• Debt covenants represent a field with high risk of manipulation; 
• Changes in management; 
• Change of auditors; 
• Management rewards (like bonuses) are tied to earnings; 
• Management implements the “repricing”, that is the change of the price of the shares on 
stock options; 
• Weakness of the governance structure: wide decisional power of the management that forms 
the board of directors and there is a weak audit committee or even non-existent; 
• Regulatory requirements (such as capital ratios for banks) are particularly at risk of 
manipulation; 
• Related parties vs arm’s length (Transactions are conducted between related companies 
rather than independent companies); 
• Earnings meet investors’ expectations, but just barely; 
• The company is potentially subject to “takeover” (i.e. to be subject to economic control by 
another company, through the purchase of the majority stake or the exchange of equity 
capital). This is the specific aspect on which the practical analysis will be conducted further 
on. 
 
The accounting and financial conditions are: 
• A change in accounting principles or estimates; 
• An Earnings surprise; 
• A drop in profitability after a positive period; 
• Constant sales or decrease in sales; 
• Profits that increase faster than sales; 
• Very low profits (which without manipulation would have resulted in losses); 
• Too low or zero growth in profit margin (which without manipulation could have been 
negative); 
• Accounting adjustments in the last quarter of the year (Penman, 2013). 
 
What is clear regarding these issues, is that the process of controlling any manipulation practice 
is not absolutely simple and direct, as very often the analyst has to deal with low-quality 
disclosures. In response to the scarce transparency of information, Penman provides the analyst 
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with a diagnostic tool in order to check the quality of earnings and figures reported in the 
financial statements. These diagnostic tools, if the disclosure is inadequate, are not meant to 
solve the problem, but to act as a “red flag” in order to warn the analyst about the possible 
presence of EM. 
Most of the diagnostic tools are accounting ratios which must be compared with those relating 
to previous years and those of comparable companies. 
Therefore, Penman (2013) proposes to look for differences from the past and differences from 
other firms and compare changes from the past with changes from the past for comparison 
firms.  
 
4.3. Diagnostic tools to identify EM. 
 
After the focus on the components of disclosure that could be subject to EM, we proceed by 
providing the outlines of the approach implemented by Penman to identify the potential 
presence of the aforementioned phenomenon applied in M&As’ deal. Firstly, we will start with 
an analysis of the quality of the sales revenue and then we try to measure the adequacy of the 
disclosure relating to the quality of the costs (core expense) and of the extraordinary 
components of income (unusual item). Finally, this will be followed by the approach adopted 
by Penman (2013) to analyze the quality of different types of transactions. 
 
4.3.1. Diagnostics to Detect manipulation of Sales 
Penman (2013) argues that revenues are considered to be appropriately reported in the income 
statement (and therefore the quality of disclosure is adequate) if they represent appropriate and 
undistorted estimates of the liquidity that should be generated through them (Penman, 2013). 
Indeed, there could be the risk that goods may be returned, receivables not paid, or sales 
recorded in the current period that belong to subsequent years (unearned revenue). Therefore, 
it is appropriate to focus on net sales calculated as follows:  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
=  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 +  𝛥 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 
−  𝛥 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 –  𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 
 
Cash from sales cannot be easily manipulated by the accounting, so what needs to be questioned 
is the accruals’ part, that affect changes in net receivables (that are net of estimated bad debts), 
allowances for sales returns and discounts, and unearned revenue. If it is not possible to  
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calculate net revenues as shown above, they are calculated according to GAAP, i.e. Net sales = 
Sales- estimates sales returns and discounts (Penman, 2013, p. 603). 
Penman (2013) provides the following manipulation diagnostics, which look for changes in 
sales relative to cash generated by sales and changes in sales relative to changes in the net 
operating assets that relate to sales:  
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠      (1) 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒        (2) 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠  (3) 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/ 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒      (4) 
By applying this first analysis we can deduce that if the company adopts an “aggressive” 
accounting policy by overestimating revenues or underestimating returns and credit losses (and 
thus does not have legitimate receivables that are being paid off in cash), the first ratio will 
increase (1), whereas the second one will decrease (2). If net sales are increasing because of 
reduced estimates of unearned (or deferred) revenue, the last ratio will increase (Penman, 2013). 
But we will investigate the change in these ratios over time in the next section through the 
empirical analysis. Obviously, these ratios can also change for legitimate reasons, not only 
because of manipulations, such as in the case of abnormal increase in receivables or because of 
delays in payments by customers. Receivables can also be indicative of the trend of the 
business, when they signal (therefore act as a red flag) for example a lower interest from 
customers towards a product, or a price discounting with the aim of increasing sales. But these 
aspects concern the quality of earnings as a whole and not only from an accounting point of 
view. 
To study, however, the incidence of costs due to bad debt, Penman (2013) elaborates these 
ratios, which directly relate these costs to credit losses (5) and sales (7) and, moreover, the bad 
debt reserves, useful for a write down in receivables, with gross receivables (6): 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒/𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠     (5) 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠/ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 (𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠)                          (6) 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒/ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠      (7) 
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4.3.2. Diagnostics to Detect Manipulation of Core Expenses  
 
The recording of expenses can also be subject to manipulation, for this reason Penman (2013) 
outlines a research method to analyze specific determinants that could alert the analyst about 
the presence of Earnings management. In particular, he suggests to: 
 
1. Investigate Changes in the Net Operating Assets with Normalized Asset Turnover. 
The manipulation of operating income always leaves a trace: in fact, changes in operating 
income imply changes in the NOA, although, as previously seen, this does not change only 
as a result of manipulations but can follow the normal business trend. Penman (2013) 
defines NOA as: NOA = Sales / Asset turnover. Recalling that ATO = Sales / Total Assets. 
 
We determine the 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝐼 =  𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 +  𝛥 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑂𝐴 
                                                =  𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 +  𝛥𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 / 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑇𝑂 
This is the normalized version of the equation seen in the first part of the section. The 
normalized ATO is calculated from average asset turnovers over past years or from 
comparable firms with similar operations and accounting policies (Penman,2013).  
Then the diagnostics in this case is given by: 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: (𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝐼) / 𝑂𝐼  
 
If this ratio is different from 1.0, it would be appropriate to conduct a deeper analysis on 
this aspect (Penman, 2013). This is the case in which, for example, an increase in NOA 
(through new investments in warehouses or raw materials, higher credits and an increase in 
accrual) is not followed by an increase in sales revenues, thereby reducing the free 
component cash flow and, consequently, the Normalized OI (which in case of manipulation 
would be less than the disclosed one). 
 
2. Investigate Changes in Asset Turnover. 
Manipulation of operating expenses always changes both profit margin (PM) and ATO, but 
in opposite directions: Lower expenses mean higher income to sales but, as net operating 
assets increase, lower expenses also mean lower sales to net operating assets. So, a change 
in ATO may indicate manipulation. And if firms are using manipulation to increase or 
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maintain profit margins, the corresponding decrease in ATO will signal a subsequent 
decrease in future profit margins as the accounting reverses.  
The manipulation of operating expenses determines a contextual variation in PM and in the 
ATO, but in opposite directions. In fact, lower costs imply a higher sales profit margin, but 
as NOA increases, we must always consider the fact that these lower expenses imply lower 
sales to NOA. As a result, a change in ATO could be useful in identifying potential 
manipulation. Indeed, companies may have implemented EM to maintain or increase the 
PM, in the event that this increase in PM corresponds to a decrease in the ATO. In particular, 
Penman (2013) observes the relationship between the variations of the RNOA and those of 
the PM compared to the different variations of ATO (Penman, 2013) and notes that an 
increase in the RNOA for the current period is followed, in most cases, by its decrease in 
the subsequent period, but this decrease will likely be greater if the company presents a 
small change in its ATO. Obviously, this relationship cannot be understood by going to 
check the quality of the accounting methods used by the company, but it concerns a general 
analysis of the disclosure quality. Therefore, Penman (2013) suggests analyzing the changes 
in ATO, comparing them with changes in sales revenues. But above all paying attention to 
cases in which PMs increase or remain constant while the ATO decreases. This may want 
to cover up a situation of decline, which the company tries to hide by manipulating the 
ATO, to try to keep the profit margin and the RNOA at previous levels. In addition, 
according to Penman (2013) it might be good to dwell on the case where the sharp increases 
in NOA are followed by very low or negative changes in the ATO (Penman, 2013). 
3. Investigate Line Items Directly 
a. Challenge Depreciation and Amortization Expense.  
A low current depreciation rate most of the times implies asset write-downs in the future, 
usually through restructuring charges or losses at the time of asset disposal; conversely, a too 
high depreciation or amortization applied to the assets results in later gains from their disposal 
(Penman, 2013). 
 
Penman analyzes this aspect starting from defining the “Adjusted EBITDA”: 
 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
=  𝑂𝐼 (𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥)  +  𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
−  𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 
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The diagnostic developed in this regard, compares the adjusted EBITDA with respect to EBIT, 
which is based on the depreciation charge reported in the income statement: 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: (𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴) / 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 
Normal capital expense is approximated by the average capital expenditure over past years or, 
to accommodate growth, normal depreciation and amortization for the level of sales, calculated 
from past (Depreciation + Amortization)-to-sales ratios. Another suggested Diagnostic is the 
following:  
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 / 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 
 
If this ratio is less than 1.0, an increase in the depreciation charge is likely to occur in the future 
(Penman, 2013). 
Some analysts use particular models in order to understand which could be the best depreciation 
rate to be adopted in order to avoid future write-downs or losses on assets. For example, if there 
is an excess of production capacity in a sector, these models estimate that you will have to 
devalue the plant, unless the current depreciation charge is adjusted to reflect the cost of excess 
capacity. It is good to adjust the depreciation rate even if technological innovation is expected 
to cause obsolescence of the plants. Therefore, a depreciation rate able to reflect these estimates 
turns out to produce higher information quality data on which to rely on and conduct analysis 
(Penman,2013). 
On the other hand, Penman (2013), states that there are some other analysts that consider 
EBITDA as a measure of income deriving from operational management to conduct an earning 
analysis. But this leads to a low-quality measure of value added, as it includes depreciation, 
which basically capture the loss in the value of the assets. So, EBITDA is not a tool to be used 
to identify added value, unless we consider the adjusted EBITDA that uses normal capital 
charge (Penman, 2013). 
 
b. Analysis of Total Accruals. 
 
As previously stated, the operating cash flow component is CFO = OI - Operating Accruals; 
for which another diagnostic is developed as follows: 
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𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝐶𝐹𝑂 / 𝑂𝐼 
 
Since cash flow from operations (CFO) are not easily affected by accounting manipulations, 
most of the changes of the operating income are carried out through the soft component of the 
accruals and therefore unjustified accruals will have an impact on this ratio. The cash flow from 
operations can also be compared to the net operating assets: 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝐶𝐹𝑂 / 𝑁𝑂𝐴, 
 
which in the presence of manipulation decreases due to the increased NOA value. 
 
However, even the operating cash flow component can be exposed to manipulation, so, as 
recommended by the fundamental analysis, it is also important to be focused on the parameters 
concerning this aspect. For example, the amortization, which is not a cash flow, but it certainly 
comes from a cash outflow that occurred in a previous period to make the investment. Same 
investment that is needed to maintain cash flows from operations. So, referring to the free cash 
flow, it must be conceived as operating cash flow - cash investments to generate operating cash 
flows. In this sense there could be manipulation in consideration of depreciation to increase 
cash flows. But also, by delaying payments, or by reducing R&D or advertising costs (Penman, 
2013). 
 
c. Challenge Individual Accruals                                                                                                                             
As mentioned above, accruals are the component that most facilitates any earnings management 
as it constitutes the “soft” part of operating income and includes prepaid expenses, deferred 
revenue and accrued expense. For each accrual (excluding depreciation and amortization) a 
diagnostic can be calculated: 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙 / 𝛥 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 
 
In this case it is good to pay attention to the accruals that greatly increase the operating result 
when this situation corresponds to an almost zero variation in sales, lower than in the past, or 
even negative. If the Δ% of sales revenues is zero or negative, this diagnostic tool does not 
work, but a comparison between the accruals and the change in sales can still be effective 
(Penman, 2013). 
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d. Analysis of other expenses that depends on estimates. 
 
Penman (2013) also develops diagnostic tools to analyze the impact of other items with respect 
to the total costs that derive from operational management, namely: 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 / 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 / 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 
 
Pension and post-employment costs can be manipulated by changing the actuarial estimates of 
expected payouts and discount rates for the liabilities, or by changing the expected return on 
the asset level. (Penman, 2013). 
 
e. Tax analysis. 
 
Actual tax rates usually converge over time to the legal rate. To calculate the incidence of taxes 
relating to operational management compared to operating income, this ratio can be used: 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 / 𝑂𝐼 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 
In particular, Penman (2013) suggests it is very important to identify the tax component that is 
subject to the estimates, that is represented by the deferred tax. If this varies at a different rate 
from that of sales, a check should be carried out (Penman, 2013). The company could 
manipulate the estimates by increasing the deferred taxes to obtain an increase in profit, in 
particular those relating to the depreciation: if these prove to be too high (compared to those of 
similar firms), or with respect to the investment growth, the company may have reported low 
depreciation expenses, following a too generous estimate on the useful life of the assets. 
(Penman, 2013, p. 610). 
 
4. Study the balance sheet items directly. 
Penman (2013) highlights some balance sheet items could be the direct object of Earnings 
management. If the residual values of the operating assets recorded in the financial statements 
are too high, they may be written down in the future, also reducing the RNOA (Penman, 2013). 
Particularly suspicious are: 
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• Assets whose residual value is higher than the market value; 
• Assets susceptible to nontypical capitalization of expenses, such as start-up costs, 
advertising and promotion, customer acquisition and product development costs, and soft- 
ware development costs.  
• Intangible assets whose carrying values and amortization rates are subject to estimate, like 
software costs and intangible assets acquired in acquisitions  
• Assets entered at “Fair Value”. This value is the result of estimate, uncertain and in the 
worst case, even distorted. 
 
The residual values of liabilities deriving from operational management should also be 
examined, in particular: 
• Estimated liabilities such as pension liabilities, liabilities relating to employment contracts, 
deferred revenue; observe the trend of these passive items with respect to the total liabilities 
inherent to the total operating liabilities. Proceeding with the examination of the estimates 
on the liabilities deriving from the guarantees granted on the products (for any claim from 
customers) two diagnostics can be calculated: 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝑊𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 / 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝑊𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 / 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 
 
• Off-balance-sheet liabilities reported in the footnotes and may include guarantees on loans, 
assignment of receivables or payables, purchase commitments, liabilities relating to 
ongoing disputes, liabilities of environmental liability for product pollution. 
• Off-balance-sheet liabilities such as loan guarantees, recourse for assigned receivables or 
debt, purchase commitments, contingent liabilities for lawsuits and regulatory penalties, 
and contingent obligations from off-balance-sheet special purpose entities  
The lack of attention on of these items, or in any case the formulation of distorted estimates, 
has a negative impact on the quality of the disclosure, with the risk of occurrence of “Earnings 
Surprises” (Penman, 2013). 
 
4.3.3. Diagnostics to Detect Manipulation of Unusual Items 
 
Unusual items are isolated from the company’s core income to improve the quality of 
information regarding the earnings shown in the financial statements. They are excluded when 
forecasting, because they are considered to be low quality for this purpose. But in any case, the 
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analyst must consider the possibility that these could have some future implications. This could 
happen with estimated restructuring charges and impairments. Firms may decide to restructure 
in the future but will include an estimate of the cost in current income, along with an estimated 
liability in the balance sheet. And they may overestimate the liability, take a bath, and bleed 
back income to income statements in the future as actual expenses are less than anticipated. The 
estimates of any merger costs are also subject to potential analysis. In fact, the companies could 
overestimate these costs and then bring these estimates to a later period to increase future profits 
and make the merger appear much more convenient than it is (Penman, 2013). 
 
With the diagnostics treated so far, Penman (2013) aims to answer the third of the five questions 
asked at the beginning of the discussion on the GAAP application quality, that is the one about 
firms using accounting methods and estimates to alter income. The fourth question, concerning 
transaction quality, deals with firms’ timing or structuring transactions to manipulate income. 
Specifically: 
 
• Core revenue timing: when the sales revenue is recorded in the current period through the 
delivery of the products, in order to increase the operating profit. In fact, GAAP requires 
that revenues are recorded after the delivery of the products and after the performing of 
services (as already mentioned before). In this case it is appropriate to pay attention to 
unexpected increases in sales and deliveries of goods, especially in the last quarter of the 
year when it is more likely that management wants to meet investors’ expectations; 
• Core revenue structuring: many techniques have been implemented to “package” revenues 
and increase results, thus making the form to prevail over substance. Penman (2013) states 
some of these cases like: 
• Transactions between related parties and those “other than arm’s length”; for 
example, shipping equipment to an affiliate that does not need the equipment 
and books it as plant, while the shipper books it as revenue;  
• Structuring lease transactions to quality as sales-type leases.  
• Swapping inventory in barter transactions. 
 
• Core Expense Timing: in this case, the period in which the costs are reported can be subject 
to manipulation to increase the profit, for example in the case of R&D and advertising costs 
Penman suggests using these specific ratios: 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝑅&𝐷 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 / 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 
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𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 / 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 
 
If too low, they could indicate an attempt to increase profits by smoothing R&D and 
advertising costs and shifting them to future years. In this case, Penman suggests observing 
the trend of these ratios over a broad time horizon, trying to identify the situations in which 
profits have been increased by reducing R&D or advertising costs. 
 
• Releasing hidden reserves: This is the creation of hidden reserves through a “conservative” 
accounting policy, and as already seen in the previous section, this practice is known as 
“cookie-jar accounting”. As a result, reserves are created and released in moments that are 
not very profitable for the company in order to reduce volatility in financial results, giving 
investors an impression of financial stability of the firm. A particular case is that of the 
“LIFO dipping” technique, which provides for a reduction in inventories through the LIFO 
method and the release of hidden reserves when the profits deriving from the liquidation of 
these inventories are realized (Penman, 2013). 
• Organizational Manipulation: Off-Balance-Sheet Operations  
These operations of manipulation of items external to the balance sheet are called “shell” and 
their creation is known as “shell game”.  
• R&D Partnership: when a company sets up the so-called “shell” company in order to 
bear the costs of research and development. The original company may actually do the 
research but then charge the R&D partnership, creating revenue for itself to offset its 
R&D expenditures.  
• Pension funds: pension funds are technically owned by employees, but the companies 
could use their "overfunding" to pay the costs deriving from operational expenses, 
which would otherwise be charged to the income statement (Penman,2013). 
In conclusion, what needs to be clear is that Penman’s approach to the quality disclosure 
analysis does not aim to solve the problem of the EM. The diagnostics suggested by his analysis 
must be taken as an instrument functional to raise some “red flags” on the quality of the 
information reported. This turns to be extremely useful in case of time consuming/ costly 
analysis. 
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Therefore, once the approach is applied, the analyst can decide whether to proceed or not with 
a further research throughout some multivariate models, in case of particularly suspicious 
situations. 
In the next section we apply some of the diagnostics tools described in this chapter, to the parties 
involved in a stock for stock M&A deal that has been recently closed. Specifically, we will drill 
through the financial statements of the two companies, by applying Penman’s model, firstly 
assuming the acquirer’s perspective and, finally, the target’s one. 
 
5. Penman’s method applied to a stock- for- stock M&A’s deal  
 
This last section will provide an application of Penman’s approach to a real case of M&A deal 
closed in 2019. Firstly, we apply it on the acquirer’s side going through the reclassification of 
the balance sheet in order to highlight and separate the operating section. Thereafter, we do the 
same for evaluating the target’s side to check if there could be some possibility of EM from 
both the perspectives. 
This specific approach reveals itself to be particularly useful from an investor’s point of view, 
because it allows to drill through the accounting’s details that characterize a particular process 
like an M&A, in order to understand if there could be a possibility that this accounting will 
reverse in the future, causing a drop in the share price of the combined company. 
The empirical analysis is conducted by taking in consideration a US M&A deal happened 
recently in order to apply the diagnostic instruments suggested by Penman (2013) on a quarterly 
basis. This is because quarterly data are available just for the most recent period in the latest 
annual report. 
In particular, we choose the case, being consistent to what has been already stated in the first 
section, in which the M&A transaction is a stock deal in order to understand if there could be 
the suspicion of manipulation especially from the bidder’s perspective. Therefore, we run the 
analysis taking into consideration all the four quarters of 2019 for having a comprehensive view 
on the point, from the period preceding the deal to the period in which the process was 
concluded. This allows us to understand whether the acquirer tried to manipulate earning or not 
with the scope of increasing its market share price and therefore to exchange a fewer number 
of stocks with the target company. In addition, as it has been already stated before, a higher 
share price would minimize the likelihood of earnings dilution.  
This analysis does not aim to solve the problem of EM, either to being accusatory towards one 
company or another. The main scope is just to provide the investors and other players in the 
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market, a ground to start with, in order to raise some red flag in case of some potentially 
suspicious situations as a preview for further checks. 
The M&A deal that we consider for applying the analysis involves two important companies in 
the US Communication Services’ sector: T-Mobile USA, Inc. and Sprint Corporation. It was 
on July 2019 that Trump administration signed off on $59bn deal to create one of the largest 
US mobile providers (Platt E., 2019), respectively the third and the fourth largest companies in 
US in their industry. T-Mobile US, Inc., founded in 1994 under the name of VoiceStream 
Wireless PCS by J.W. Stanton, is the third-largest wireless carrier in the United States, with 
headquarters in Washington, US. The Merger has been completed on April 1, 2020 with T-
Mobile now having the total ownership in Sprint, making Sprint a subsidiary of T-Mobile until 
the Sprint brand is totally absorbed. 
As far as the analysis is concerned, we pick this specific deal for two main reasons: 
1. The M&A transaction is very recent and therefore we have the possibility to apply the main 
diagnostic tools directly on the 2019’s different quarters, since the deal has been signed off 
on July 2019 and completed just at the beginning of 2020. This is why it makes sense to 
take into consideration the whole 2019 timeframe (note that the Q1 interim report for 2020 
is not out yet); 
2. Secondly, to show that Penman’s method can be applied to any combined company the 
investor might want to invest in, or any player in the market that is interested in that specific 
firm, in order to generate a first impression and investigate the potential presence of EM. 
 
5.1. Application of diagnostics to the acquirer company (T- Mobile US) 
 
Before proceeding with the direct calculation of diagnostics, we apply Penman's approach to 
analyze the accruals, which represents the main tool for the manipulation of results. For this 
reason, a reclassification of the financial statements is carried out first, to identify the operating 
component, in order to be aware of the change in the NOA and analyze the possible presence 
of manipulation, establishing to what extent this can have an influence on the operating result. 
Therefore, we reclassify the operating part of T-Mobile US, Inc., balance sheet following 
Penman's specific approach to calculate the NOA for the period Q418-Q419, that is the one in 
which the M&A transaction under analysis has taken place.  
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 Table 1: T-Mobile US, Inc. Reformulated Balance Sheet 
Reformulated balance sheet (Operating section) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q418 
$ Millions 
     
Working Cash (estimated 2% of revenues) 166 169 172 174 164 
Acc. Receivables less allowances for doubtful accounts 1,749 1,817 1,822 1,888 1,769 
Inventories 1,261 998 801 964 1,084 
Prepaid expenses and other current assets 4,280 4,176 4,162 4,925 4,214 
PPE, net 21,464 21,847 22,098 21,984 23,359 
Goodwill 1,901 1,901 1,930 1,930 1,901 
Identifiable Intangible assets 35,618 36,430 36,442 36,465 35,559 
Deferred income taxes and other assets 13,006 13,907 14,326 14,522 3,368 
Total operating assets 79,445 81,245 81,753 82,852 71,418 
Accounts payable and accrued liabilities 7,330 7,260 6,406 6,746 7,741 
Deferred revenues 665 620 608 631 698 
Deferred taxes 4,925 5,090 5,296 5,607 4,472 
Other current liabilities 1,129 1,564 1,883 1,673 787 
Operating lease liabilities 9,339 10,145 10,614 10,539 0 
Total operating liabilities 23,388 24,679 24,807 25,196 13,698 
NET OPERATING ASSETS (Op. assets - Op. liabilities) 56,057 56,566 56,946 57,656 57,720 
 
After this reclassification we obtain the NOA as the difference between operating assets and 
operating liabilities and we do it for all the quarters, so that we can calculate the RNOA for the 
quarters 3 and 4 and make a comparison between the two. In fact, we consider the relationship 
seen in the previous section, OI = C-I + ΔNOA, from which we note that any increases in 
operating income could be due to an increase in NOA, being the component of free cash flow 
(C-I) much more complex to manipulate. More specifically, as it has already been stated, an 
increase in NOA creates operating income and a higher current RNOA0 but results in a high 
NOA0 that becomes the base for next year's RNOA: RNOA1 = OI1 / NOA0. Accordingly, 
RNOA1 declines if NOA0 has been inflated (Penman, 2013). Therefore, I proceed by applying 
















= 0.08 =≫ 8% 
 
In this case RNOA increases from quarter 3 to quarter 4 and so we cannot say from this first 
analysis that NOA was subject to manipulation. 
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Going further with the analysis we know that the aforementioned equation OI = C-I+ ΔNOA, 
can written as OI= C-I+ Operating Accruals. Even in this case, being the operating cash flow 
the most difficult to be managed, a potential inflation in the operating income could derive from 
the manipulation in the operating accrual part. Therefore, if we rewrite the equation as             
Cash flow from operations = OI – Operating accruals, we can investigate the soft component 
through the diagnostic CFO / OI by observing the trend of this ratio for the time horizon of 

































By looking at the trend, we observe that the ratio increases over the period considered, but as 
explained before if earnings were manipulated by boosting the OI, this would have decreased 
the diagnostic over the timeframe. But this is not the case. 
On the same line we drill down into the equation and we challenge it using the diagnostic that 
compares the cash flow from operations with the Net Operating Assets, being aware that if the 
ratios decreases over the period this could be a red flag for the investors because it would mean 








And for 2019, 


























In this case we notice a decrease in the ratio just for the first time slot considered, that is the 
transition period that goes from the last quarter of 2018 to the first quarter in 2019. This could 
also represent an attempt of manipulation from the acquirer’s side during the period in which 
the M&A deal was announced. 
• Investigate changes in Assets Turnover in relation to the Profit Margin 
Penman (2013) suggests also analyzing the variations of the ATO (= Sales / Average total asset) 
in relation to profit margin, paying particular attention to the cases in which we observe a 
decrease in the ATO in a given period of time and a simultaneous increase in the profit margin. 
This could reveal an attempt to maintain or increase profit margins which, in absence of 
manipulation, would be much lower (Penman, 2013). We then proceed with the analysis of the 
trend that the ATO and the PM assume respectively, taking as reference the period 2019 



















((84,788 + 86,109)/ 2)
= 0.13 
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𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑄4 =
11,878
((86,109 + 86,921)/ 2)
= 0.14 




























= 0.81 =≫ 81% 
 
Summing up the results, we observe a constant trend in the period under analysis, meaning that 
we have a decrease in the Asset turnover in the transition between Q1 and Q2 and we can tell 
the same for the profit margin in the same period. As well as in the transition between the third 
and the fourth quarter an increase in the ATO is matched with an increase in the PM. Therefore, 
we cannot conclude that there has been some manipulation in these specific figures (see Table 
2). 
Table 2 Comparison between ATO and PM 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
ATO 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.14 
PM 81% 80% 80% 81% 
 
 
• Diagnostics to Detect manipulation of Sales 
 
We now focus on investigating a figure that could probably be subject to EM, that is represented 
by the sales, fundamental component in order to sustain a competitive advantage overtime for 
any type of business. 
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As argued by Penman, revenues are correctly recorded in the income statement if they represent 
an appropriate estimate of the sales that will actually occur (Penman, 2013). In particular, we 
are going to compare the net revenues (Net sales = Cash from sales + Δ Net accounts receivable 
-Δ Allowance for sales returns and discounts- Unearned revenue) with all the items that appear 
in the corresponding calculation, and we observe the trend of the various ratios for the four 
quarters in 2019. Since the “cash from sales” component does not easily lend itself to EM, what 
could possibly increase the value of these revenues shown in the income statement is the 
manipulation of the account receivables, unearned revenue and allowances for sale returns and 
discounts (Penman, 2013). 
The calculation of the components within the equation could be compromised by the lack of 
precise information provided by financial statements prepared in the 10-K form. Therefore, 
however, we proceed with the comparison of net sales with all the items that appear in the 
equation by means of the diagnostics developed by Penman (2013): 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠                                                                         (1) 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒             (2) 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠        (3) 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/ 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒                          (4) 
 
Starting from these ratios, we know that, if there was manipulation, this would affect the 
accounts receivable by increasing them (and by reducing the allowances) or the deferred 
revenue (or unearned revenue) which would go down. Consequently, in the presence of EM, 
the first ratio which compares the net sales with the cash generated by them increases, due to 
the higher revenues reported in the income statement; at the same time the second ratio 
decreases, due to the higher net accounts receivable. The third ratio would increase if the 
allowances are reduced in order to boost the account receivables. Finally, the fourth ratio should 
increase due to the lower deferred revenues recognized in the period. Therefore, we summarize 
the results in the table below for the quarters in 2019 (see Table 3): 
 
Table 3 Diagnostics to detect manipulated sales 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Net Sales/ Cash from sales 1.75 2.08 1.73 1.82 
Net Sales/ Net Accounts Rec. 1.44 1.27 1.57 1.48 
Net Sales/ Allowances 19.41 17.98 22.40 21.76 
Net Sales/ Unearned Revenue   3.79 3.71 4.72 4.41 
 - 69 - 
In line with what it has been stated before, we observe that the first diagnostic increases 
substantially in the transaction between the first and the second quarter and between the third 
and the fourth one. This is interestingly followed by a decrease in the second ratio for the same 
period. Therefore, this could be interpreted as another red flag to conduct further analysis on 
this point. Regarding the third ratio, it increases significantly just in the transaction period 
between the second quarter and the third one, but we can say this is not relevant since the 
allowances are kept constant for that period and did not decrease as an attempt to boost the 
accounts receivables. Sticking to the fourth ratio, we observe that it is subject to an increase 
because the unearned revenues decrease between the second and the third quarter. Therefore, 
another check could be added to what has been shown above, in the sense that we can compare 
the variation in the net sales for that period to the variation in unearned revenues for the same 
timeframe. We do as follow, 
 
∆% 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 = [
(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑄3 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑄2)
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑄2
 ] ∗ 100 
 
∆% 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 = [
(2,867 − 2,302)
2,302
 ] ∗ 100 = 24.54% 
 
∆% 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 = [
(𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑄3 − 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑄2)
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑄2
 ] ∗ 100 
 
∆% 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 = [
(1,608 − 620)
620
 ] ∗ 100 = −1.94% 
 
We observe that the two percentage variations go into opposite directions, so this is considered 
as a starting point to conduct further analysis on this aspect, since it could also be that unearned 
revenues may have been reduced in order to increase the net sales. 
 
• Diagnostics to Challenge Depreciation and Amortization Expenses 
 
Finally, for the last analysis on the acquirer company’s side we challenge depreciation and 
amortization expense starting from the equation mentioned in the previous section, that is: 
Adjusted EBITDA= OI + Depreciation and amortization – Normal Capital expense 
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Specifically, I consider the Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP financial measure) reported in the 
financial statements and I compare it with the operating income (EBIT) of each quarter of 2019. 
This is done in order to check if depreciation and amortization expenses have been reduced or 
increased too much during the period. We compute the diagnostics to check this reasoning, but 
we observe a constant overall trend in the ratio, therefore we cannot really take it as a red flag 






























Going on with the analysis I calculate the capital expense from the equation stated before 
(Capital expense = Adjusted EBITDA-OI-Depreciation and Amortization) to challenge the 
figures and trying to understand whether the trend in the ratio is constant or not. Firstly, it is 
important to check if the ratio is higher than 1, because if this was not the case a higher 
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From the calculations we notice that the ratio is always higher that 1, but it assumes a trend that 
is not constant overtime. The most evident change in the ratio is registered between the first 
and the second quarter because of higher capital expenses. Indeed, these higher capital expenses 
are followed by an increase in depreciation and amortization during the third quarter, meaning 
that this could be considered as another red flag for detecting a potential manipulation. 
 
5.2. Application of diagnostics to the Target company (Sprint Corporation) 
 
In this section we repeat the analysis applied before but assuming another point of view: the 
one of the target company involved in the M&A deal, that in this case is Sprint Corporation. 
Due to the limited information disclosed in the 10-Q financial statement of the target company, 
we could not apply all the diagnostic tools used before with acquirer company. But on the one 
hand, this is something related to the quality of disclosure that company decide to adopt. On 
the other hand, it is also a drawback of Penman’s approach, in the sense that it is not always 
completely applicable and effective when the information reported in the financial statement is 
not exhaustive. 
We start by reclassifying the balance sheet for Sprint Corporation, isolating the operating 
section. We follow Penman's approach to calculate the NOA for the period 2019, in which the 
M&A deal has been signed off (see Table 4).  
Note that for this company we apply all the diagnostic tools referring to the quarters from Q2 
to Q4 due to the fact that the information about revenues and other relevant figures was not 
complete for the first quarter. 
 
Table 4: Sprint Corporation, Reformulated Balance Sheet 
Reformulated balance sheet (Operating section) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
$ Millions 
    
Working Cash (estimated 2% of revenues) N/A 111 105 108 
Acc. Receivables less allowances for doubtful accounts 3,554 3,558 3,723 3,873 
Inventories 999 726 963 1,117 
Prepaid expenses and other current assets 1,289 1,436 1,197 1,224 
PPE, net 21,201 20,556 20,562 20,827 
Goodwill 4,598 4,598 4,598 4,598 
Identifiable Intangible assets 43,234 42,999 42,894 42,410 
Total operating assets 74,875 73,984 74,042 74,157 
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Accounts payable  3,961 3,672 3,918 3,396 
Accrued liabilities 3,597 3,048 3,198 3,335 
Deferred taxes 7,556 7,563 7,489 7,038 
Current operating lease liabilities 0 1,680 1,835 1,860 
Long-term operating lease liabilities 0 5,913 5,667 5,423 
Total operating liabilities 15,114 21,876 22,107 21,052 
NET OPERATING ASSETS (Op. assets - Op. liabilities) 59,761 52,108 51,935 53,105 
 
With the calculation of NOA, as the difference between the operating asset and the operating 
liabilities we can now observe the trend assumed by the RNOA during the last two quarters of 
















= 0.013 =≫ 1.3% 
 
Consistently to the previous reasoning, we observe that the ratio increases during the period of 
analysis and therefore we cannot really state that the NOA of the year before has been inflated 
by means of manipulation because it does show an evident increase. 
 
Going further with the analysis we apply the diagnostic explained before started from the 
equation that sees the cash from operation as the algebraic sum between the operating income 
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By examining the ratio, we observe that the “hard” component, that is the cash flow from 
operations, increases and this cause an increase in the whole ratio overtime. Whereas if earnings 
were manipulated by inflating the OI, this would have decreased the diagnostic over the 
timeframe. So, we cannot say that there is any red flag that could be raised from this specific 
analysis. 
Drilling through the equation, we investigate it using the diagnostic that compares the cash flow 
from operations with the NOA and by computing the ratios we observe that they increase 
overtime. This means that the NOA has not been increased simply because there is also a 























• Investigate changes in Assets Turnover in relation to the Profit Margin 
We investigate the variations of the ATO (= Sales / Average total asset) in relation to profit 
margin (see Table 5), focusing on the cases in which a decrease in the Asset turnover ratio is 
followed by an increase in the profit margin. By summing up the results in the table below, we 
observe that the asset turnover decreases between the second and the third quarter, whereas the 
profit margin is subject to a relatively high increase. This could be interpreted as an attempt to 
increase the profit margin in a period in which the M&A deal was in process of completion.  
This because of a decrease in ATO means that the revenues were not enough to maintain the 
asset turnover of the previous year. Therefore, the fact that the PM increased raises some 
suspicion of potential EM.   
 
Table 5: Comparison between ATO and PM 
 
Q2 Q3 Q4 
ATO 0.064 0.059 0.062 
PM 69.26% 77.72% 68.28% 
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• Diagnostics to Detect manipulation of Sales 
 
As final analysis we investigate the sales item for the target company. Once again, we compute 
the ratios having as numerator the net revenues (Net sales = Cash from sales + Δ Net accounts 
receivable - Δ Allowance for sales returns and discounts - Unearned revenue), and as 
denominator the different items that appear in the mentioned equation. We observe the trend of 
the various diagnostics over the period that goes from the second to the fourth quarter. As 
Penman (2013) noticed, the calculation of the components within the equation could be 
compromised by the lack of precise information. In the specific case, it was not possible for me 
to find details for the calculation of the unearned revenues of Sprint Corporation’s financial 
statements prepared in the 10-Q form. Therefore, however, we proceed with the comparison of 
net revenues with the other items that appear in the calculation by means of the diagnostics 
developed by Penman: 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠                                                                                   (1) 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒                                  (2) 
𝐷𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐: 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠   (3) 
 
Keeping that in mind, in the presence of EM, the first ratio which compares the net revenues 
with the cash generated by them increases, due to the higher revenues reported in the income 
statement; at the same time the second ratio decreases due to the higher net accounts receivable 
and the third ratio should increase as well. Therefore, the calculation of our ratios for the period 
considered are summarized below (see Table 6): 
 
Table 6 Diagnostics to detect manipulated sales 
 
Q2 Q3 Q4 
Net Sales/ Cash from sales 1.67 1.83 2.54 
Net Sales/ Net Accounts Rec. 2.29 2.09 2.09 
Net Sales/ Allowances 11.06 10.46 10.45 
 
Overall, we can say there is just one point in time in which we observe an antithetical behavior 
between the first and the second ratio. That is the transitional period among the second and the 
third quarter.  This could raise some question on the potential application of EM.  
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Moreover, we cannot confirm the same attitude when it comes to shifting from the third to the 
fourth quarter because even if the first ratio increases the second one remains constant, giving 
quite low doubt for EM presence. 
 
5.3. Comparison of results for the acquirer and the target and limitations 
 
To conclude we can finally compare the results of the application of Penman’s approach on the 
two different parties in the M&A deal. To have an exhaustive overview on the perspectives 
assumed it is important to wrap everything up by going to show all the specific diagnostics used 
for the analysis and scrutinize the fields in which we found a ground of suspicion of EM. 
Therefore, we do that by summarizing the output in the following table (See Table 7): 
 
Table 7 Comparison of results 
Diagnostics Potential EM (Acquirer) Potential EM (Target) 
𝑪𝑭𝑶
𝑶𝑰





Between the 4th 2018 and 1st 2019 
No 
𝑨𝑻𝑶 𝒗𝒔 𝑷𝑴 No 
Yes 








Between the 1st and 2nd & 3rd and 4th 
Yes 














Between the 1st and 2nd quarters 
N/A 
 
By looking at results we cannot really establish which company between the acquirer and the 
target has raised more suspicion of EM with its accounting, simply because of a lack of 
disclosure from the target’s side. This is also the field in which the method of analysis used 
finds its biggest limitations. In fact, for example, it was not possible to compute the last three 
ratios reported in the table above because we could not find the adjusted EBITDA item in the 
target’s financial reports. As a consequence, the last diagnostic (D&A/Capital expense) is 
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missing for the target, because we could not calculate the capital expense item through 
backward induction from the equation for the calculation of the adjusted EBITDA that we have 
seen in the previous section. 
Overall it is interesting to observe that for all the time framework under analysis – which for 
the acquirer it comprehends figures from the Q4 2018 to the Q4 2019 and for the target it goes 
from the Q2 to Q4 2019 – the part in which a potential red flag could be raised is the period 
that goes from the last quarter in 2018 to the third one in 2019. This is an important insight 
because the time slot considered has been also the one in which an increase in the stock price 
of the acquirer was registered. Of course, we have to be aware that this could happen for many 
different reasons and that could be simply attributable to a better performance of the company 
in that specific period of time. Moreover, this is still coherent with the main aim of Penman’s 
approach that does not mean to appoint a certain behavior of the ratios under analysis as an EM 
evidence. It just wants to make the investor aware that no potential manipulation should be 
excluded before sharing some risks and “putting money” in a new combined company because 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This thesis aims to analyze how stock-for-stock M&A influence the use of income increasing 
EM in the period prior to such a merger or acquisition. This examination is done by performing 
computations of some diagnostics developed by Penman (2013) on a recent case of M&A deal 
announced on 2018 and closed in 2020.  
Over the last decades M&As have become a widespread growth strategy adopted by companies. 
This could happen for many reasons and the most cited motive is the creation of synergies, that 
aims to enhance the value for shareholders, investors and all the players involved in the “game”. 
Koller et al. (2015) identified six “Archetypes” in which an M&A should fit in order to create 
value. Firstly, it should be functional to improve the performance of the target company; 
secondly, it should lead to consolidation for removing the excess capacity from a specific 
industry; thirdly, it should create or accelerate market access for the target or bidder’s 
products/services. Moreover, it is important that a firm involved in an M&A deal leads to a 
faster acquisition of skills or technologies and at a lower cost compared to the internal 
development of these factors; that allows the players involved to exploit a business scalability 
or that facilitates a bidder to pick winners target than competitors would do. 
 
According to Bruner (2002), an “investment is successful if it does anything other than destroy 
value”. In Bruner’s words an M&A deal destroys value when it “does not pay”, therefore 
revealing itself not as profitable as it was estimated to be. This may happen for various reasons, 
one of them could be attributable to the EM phenomenon. 
 
Schipper (1989) conceives EM as the targeted manipulation of disclosure in the financial 
reporting process by managers or shareholders having a particular interest in the company, with 
the aim of obtaining personal gain, in contrast to what should be the merely neutral function of 
this process (Schipper, 1989). According to Healy & Wahlen (1999), there is EM when 
“managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports either to mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers”. 
When analysts make forecasts, they rely on the information reported in the financial statements. 
Therefore, they deal with a corporate disclosure and with accounting policies that are not always 
appropriate for the development of estimates that reflect the real value of the company. Indeed, 
the information transmitted may be artificial or incomplete. Over the years, this has led to an 
increasing attention by researchers towards the willingness to unmask these manipulative 
practices, through the implementation of progressively more interesting methods. 
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Literature shows that suggest that being involved in a stock-for-stock M&A deal gives 
participants incentives to apply EM practice, so that the acquirer is able to pays less for the 
target. As highlighted by Erickson and Wang (1999), the higher the price of the acquiring firm’s 
stock on the agreement date, the fewer the number of shares that must be issued to purchase the 
target firm. This mechanism provides several incentives for the acquiring firm to attempt to 
increase its share price pre-merger for at least three reasons: to minimize the likelihood of 
earnings dilution and voting power reduction in order to keep the control over the target, 
particularly manager-shareholders and, clearly to lower the cost of acquiring the target firm 
(Erickson and Wang, 1999). 
Among the different methods to investigate the potential presence of EM, particular interest 
within this thesis was addressed to a more pragmatic approach developed by Penman (2013). 
It provides some diagnostics tools that result to be challenging towards the different items of 
the firms’ financial disclosure, by means of comparison of the ratios throughout a certain time 
framework. 
Specifically, I applied this method to a real case of M&A deal closed in 2019, which has seen 
involved two important firms in the US Communication Services’ sector: T-Mobile USA, Inc., 
and Sprint Corporation. The main reason why I have chosen this specific deal is that I needed 
to study a very recent M&A transaction in order to apply the main diagnostic tools directly on 
the 2019’s different quarters and in fact, this deal has been signed off on July 2019 and 
completed just at the beginning of 2020. Another reason is found in the extent to which I wanted 
to show that Penman’s method can be applied to any combined company the investor might 
want to invest in, or any player in the market that is interested in that specific firm, in order to 
generate a first impression and investigate the potential presence of EM. 
Firstly, this study provides the application of Penman’s approach to the acquirer’s side going 
through the reclassification of the balance sheet in order to highlight and separate the operating 
section. Thereafter it provides the same for evaluating the target’s side, to check if there could 
be some possibility of EM from both the perspectives. From the first analysis implemented on 
the acquirer’s figures I found that the period in which a possible red flag on potential accrual 
manipulation is mostly the one between the last quarter in 2018 to the third quarter in 2019, 
that is also the initial period in which the M&A was announced. Therefore, this could be seen 
as a possible attempt of income manipulation. On the target’s side, I did not find such a strong 
potential suspicious situation, because of a lack of disclosure in its financial statements for the 
period under analysis.  
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It is important to clarify that Penman’ approach to the quality disclosure analysis does not aim 
to solve the problem of the EM. The diagnostics suggested by his analysis must be taken as an 
instrument functional to raise some “red flags” on the quality of the information reported. This 
turns to be extremely useful in case of time consuming/ costly analysis. 
Therefore, once the approach is applied, the analyst can decide whether to proceed or not with 
a further research throughout some multivariate models, in case of particularly suspicious 
situations. 
 
However, this does not come without any limitations. In fact, it is important to be aware that it 
would be impossible to have total disclosure transparency in the communication between 
managers and investors. Furthermore, this method does not take into account various qualitative 
aspects peculiar to the individual company. The most evident restriction derives from the fact 
that it is not fully applicable in the event that, from the financial statements, there is no detailed 
disclosure for each item to be analyzed. Indeed, in our specific case it was not possible to 
challenge all the figures from the target’s perspective. 
The main problem of this model is to evaluate how reliable it is, as it is still little applied and 
known compared to purely statistical methods, widely discussed in the literature. An alternative 
solution could be to implement these diagnostics not only by making a comparison of a 
company's performance compared to that of previous years, but also by processing an analysis 
on a sample of companies belonging to the same sector. This is to assess the method's ability to 
identify the potential presence of manipulation, but above all the business areas most exposed 
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